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THE QUALIFICATION OF LOAN PARTICIPATIONS AS
SECURITIES -THE POTENTIAL FOR LEAD
BANK LIABILITY UNDER RULE 1OB-5
AND SECTION 12(2): AN IMPACT
WITH INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
Within the past decade the international banking market has
experienced unprecedented growth not only in the scope of international financial intermediation but in the number of banks actively
involved.' The lure that entices entry into this complex and highly

sophisticated financial arena is the promise of big profits and rapid
expansion.2 The name of the game in international banking, and
perhaps the one factor which accounts for its success, is its primary

founding principle of effectively putting money to work.3 High
I. In 1%0, eight United States banks operated 131 overseas branches. Edwards, International Banking. An Overview, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 7 (no. 4, 1975). By 1965, this
number increased only slightly to 13 United States banks managing 211 foreign offices.
Aliber, International Banking: Growth and Regulation, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD BUs. 9, 10 (no.
4, 1975). However, in 1975, more than 130 United States banks operated approximately 750
foreign branches together with many more affiliates and subsidiaries engaged in all kinds of
related financial activities. Edwards, supra, at 7. Foreign assets of United States banks (i.e.
assets to foreign branches) constituted just 3.5 billion dollars in 1960, or 1.4% of total United
States bank assets; in 1965, these respective figures were approximately 9.0 billion dollars
and 2.6% of the assets. Aliber, supra, at 10. A phenomenal increase in assets occurred in the
subsequent 10 year period, elevating this figure to approximately 200 billion dollars and 15%
of the total domestic bank assets. Edwards, supra, at 7.
Correspondingly, a notable increase occurred in the number of non-United States banks
operating in American financial markets. In 1965, 19 foreign banks operated a total of 36
branches in the United States; total assets were estimated at 5.0 billion dollars. Aliber, supra,
at 10. In 1975, 175 foreign-owned banking institutions were operating in the United States,
with total assets estimated at approximately 58 billion dollars. Edwards, supra, at 7-8.
2. In 1975, major United States banks derived from 30% to 60% of their net annual
earnings from foreign sources. Between November, 1974, and May, 1975, the assets of
United States branches of foreign banks more than doubled. Edwards, supra note 1, at 7-8.
See also Thoman, International Banking Can Be Profitable for U.S. Regional Banks, 10
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 23 (no. 4, 1975); Klopstock, Foreign Banks in the United States.Scope and Growth of Operations, MONTHLY REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
NEW YORK, June 1973, at 140; The 75 Most Active Lead Managers in the Euromarkets,
EUROMONEY, Sept. 1976, at 24.
3. International banking is primarily a lender's market. Mendelsohn, A Lender's Market, BANKER, Aug. 1976, at 903. International banking originated with the early beginnings
of international trade over 4,000 years ago in Egypt and Sumer. Jacobs, The Development of
International and Multinational Banking in Europe, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 33, 36 (no. 4,
1975).
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scaled international lending has been the financial intermediary re-

sponsible for much of the developing world's industrial growth witnessed within the past decade.' And, as far as money lending goes,
a substantial portion of this financing has been made with relative

ease in the form of participation loans.'
In participating a loan generally, the originating or "lead"
bank will grant a loan to the borrower and then apportion the

credit by offering shares to a large number of other competing
banks.6 In essence, the lead and "participating" banks form a group
to share in the risk and reward of granting a single large loan to a
foreign corporation or government.7 The lead bank enters into a
separate agreement with each participating bank by which the latter agrees to advance a specified portion of the total loan sum in
exchange for a part interest in the original loan made by the lead.8
The rationale behind the widespread use of participation loans
in the international lending market is but a well-designed strategy
intended to satisfy the objectives of both lead and participant
4. Mathews, Banks v. Banks, Wall St. J., Sept. 14,1976, at 1, col. 6. See also Agtmael,
Evaluatingthe Risks of Lending to Developing Countries,EUROMONEY, Apr. 1976, at 86. The
increasing integration of world financial markets followed from the increasing efforts by corporations in manufacturing, resource extraction, and commerce to exploit their advantages in
foreign markets. Aliber, supra note 1, at 10.
5. Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6. See also Lees, InternationalLending Strategies
of CommercialBanks, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 40 (no. 4, 1975).
6. Armstrong, The Developing Law of ParticipationAgreements, 50 J. COM. BANK
LENDING, July 1968, at 45.
7. This type of multibank lending is to be distinguished from true multibank loan
syndications in which each bank in the group is active in all phases of negotiation and loan
structuring and co-manages the loan on an equal status with all other participants, including
the lead bank. Mathews, supra note 4, col. 6; see also Curran, How the Medium-Term Market
in Euroloansis Changing,BANKER, Jan. 1976, at 63.
In a participation loan typically the participating banks are not creditors of the borrower. The lead bank alone is named as the secured party in the loan agreement and as
payee with respect to notes evincing the borrower's obligation. Only in the event of default
does a participant receive a right in secured collateral; even then an action on behalf of a
participant against a defaulting borrower must be brought by the lead. Armstrong, supra
note 6, at 46, 50-51; see also In re Yale Express, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Riggs, ParticipationAgreements in the EurocurrencyMarket. An American Legal Analysis, 3
INT'L Bus. LAW. 93, 102-03 (1975).
8. See generally G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 725 (7th ed.
1973). The underlying loan in which the participant acquires an interest will have been
originated and closed by the lead bank. All loan documentation and negotiation will have
been handled and recorded in its name, and the documents, together with any collateral,
retained in its possession. Thus, at the time the lead bank sells or pledges all or part of its
interest in the loan, the lead bank remains both the legal and equitable owner of the entire
loan. Simpson, Loan Participations.Pitfalls/or Participants,31 Bus. LAW. 1977, 1978-79
(1976).
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banks. Lead banks commonly seek to realize the opportunities for

diversification and spreading of risk through the sale of participations;9 participating the loan is often required to bring the amount
within the legal lending limits.10 This arrangement allows the lead
to maintain an exclusive relationship with the borrower" while creating the means to facilitate future borrowing needs in the event of
increased costs.12

Participations in a loan are often purchased by banks seeking
to "break into" the international lending market. Banks use this3
avenue of participation not only to acquire expertise in the area,'
but to make valuable connections for future opportunities.' 4 For
both parties, participation lending is a profitable venture.' 5
9. Lees, supra note 5, at 40; Simpson, supra note 8, at 1977.
10. The National Bank Act fixes a limitation on the size of loans that national banks
may make to any one person. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976). Foreign countries generally have similar
legislation in force controlling both foreign and domestic banks; such legislation includes
England's Companies Act of 1948 and its 1967 Amendment, Germany's Banking Law of
January 1, 1962, and Regulation D in the European Common Market. France, Switzerland,
Austria, Italy, Holland, and Denmark are also known to have such legislation in force. See
generally Armstrong, supra note 6, at 45-46; Jacobs, supra note 3, at 33; Simpson, supra note
8, at 1977.
11. In true multibank syndicates where each participant attains the status of co-manager and hence each appears equally on all documentation, the risk remains that one of the
co-lending banks will establish a permanent relationship with the borrower, thereby causing
the originating bank to lose a valuable customer. Konrad, Particpationswith FinanceCompanies, 50 J. COM. BANK LENDING, Apr. 1968, at 33; Robinson, Finance Companies and Banks
Participatingin Loans, 51 J. COM. BANK LENDING, Oct. 1968, at 11. The split-borrowing

relationship created in multibank loan syndicates is often times impractical with reference to
both administrative handling and sound lending practices because of the secured nature of
the credit and the complexities involved in loan documentation. Stivers, An Analysis of Techniques Utilized to Meet the Loan ParticipationNeeds of Correspondent Banks, 53 J. COM.
BANK LENDING, Dec. 1970, at 31-32. In a participation loan, the lead bank handles all documentation and administrative aspects of the loan. The sale of participations effects no change
in the state of record title to the loan and any collateral therefor. The obligor continues to
deal solely with the lead bank. Simpson, supra note 8, at 1979.
12. Lees, supra note 5, at 46.
13. Few regional banks have more than a handful of persons with knowledge of international banking, and few of these persons have solid experience in putting together the
large and innovative financing transactions that make the most money for the bank. As well,
most regional banks have far fewer specialized activities than the large money-center banks.
Thus, lending becomes their key activity for international expansion. Thoman, supra note 2,
at 25.
14. Though this is often cited as the reason for participation, it was noted that participation seldom builds relationships with borrowers. The banking relationship stays with the
bank originating the syndicate. Hence, a bank participating with the hope of getting its "foot
in the door" may never have a chance of expanding its relationships with borrowers.
Thoman, supra note 2, at 25-26. See also note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
15. A lead bank usually receives a sizeable commitment fee from the borrower for
setting up the participation. A commitment fee can run as low as .25% per annum for the
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But a burgeoning legal battle under way in the United States, 6
which has aroused the intense interest of the international banking

world, threatens to make such lending a more costly, time consuming, and less attractive process than it has been. In seven separate
law suits,' 7 European-American Banking Corporation (EAB), as
lead bank, is accused of exploiting regional American banks by in-

ducing them to participate in loans of millions of dollars to EMJ
Colocotronis, a Greek shipping group presently in shaky financial
condition. 8
The pending suits have international ramifications. EAB became the largest foreign-owned bank in the United States when it
took over insolvent Franklin National Bank of New York in late
1974.19 Its shareholders number Britain's Midland Bank, Deutsche
Bank, Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank, the French Soci6t6 G6n6rale,
Belgium's Soci~t6 Generale de Banque, Banca Commerciale Italiana, and the Austrian Creditanstalt Bankverein.2 °
unused portion of the loan, accruing from the day the loan agreement is signed. The fee is
negotiated and, in the case of a participation loan, may be apportioned among participating
banks. In such a case, the lead bank usually charges a management fee which is not shared
with participants. Lees, supra note 5, at 45-46 & n. 12. See also Curran, supra note 7, at 63.
International lending has been a high growth activity for even smaller regional banks
active in participations. See Thoman, supranote 2, at 23-24. As well, all participants and the
lead bank receive their proportionate interest shares in the loan. Without directly allocating
large sums of money to any one source, participations in loans allow banks to constantly put
capital to work in several areas and receive returns in the form of interest profit. Lees, supra
note 5, at 41, 43-47.
16. Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6. See also Fleming & Wyles, U.S. Legal Russel
Raises Basic Banking Issues, Financial Times, May 27, 1976, at 6; In and Out of Court, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at 35.
17. In the suits filed in New York, United Virginia is asking for the recovery of
$2.5 million; American National Bank & Trust Co. of New Jersey, $1.5 million; and
City National of Detroit, $3.6 million. In suits in federal court in Philadelphia, First
Pennsylvania Bank is seeking $2.5 million and Fidelity Bank, $1.5 million.
Complaints also have been filed in federal courts in Texas by Republic National Bank of Dallas for a refund of $5.6 million and Texas Commerce Bank of
Houston for $1.8 million.
Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6. All seven suits have been consolidated in New York
federal court. Telephone interview with Mr. Michael Maney, counsel for EAB, in New York,
Nov. 3, 1976.
18. Colocotronis suffered a severe liquidity crisis last year and apparently was unable
to meet its obligation on banking debts of about 310 million dollars. Some 50 European and
American banks were involved in syndicates which provided these loans. In early January,
1976, it was announced that a moratorium on principal due at some of the banks, including
EAB, had been agreed upon. In total, EAB arranged over 100 million dollars worth of loans
for the Colocotronis group; about 30 United States banks participated in these loans. Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1976, at 45, col. 6.
19. EAB arranged most of the disputed loans to the Colocotronis group before it took
over Franklin National. Mathews, supra note 4, at I, col. 6.
20. Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6. EAB is to be classified a medium-term con-
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The seven suits against EAB raise the major issue of whether a
lead bank should be held liable to other participating lenders for
misstating a borrower's credit standing, general financial condition,
and other relevant information. 2 The legal rights of the participating banks, formalized in a document known as a "participation
agreement," contained certain provisions absolving the lead lender,

EAB, from contractual liability in the event that Colocotronis subsequently experienced financial difficulty.22 Hence, the bulk23 of allegations against EAB fall within the terms of the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts. The participating banks seek to establish the loan

participations as securities and consequently place liability on EAB
for violation of the antifraud provisions of section 12(2) of the 1933
sortium bank which arranged Euro-financing. THE BANKER, Feb. 1976, at 109-10. Many of
these banks were established in the 1970's by groups of internationally oriented banks for the
purpose of providing medium-term loans in the Eurocurrency market. These medium-term
consortium banks have enjoyed strong connections through their parent institutions, resulting in a rapid growth in their Eurocurrency operations. Lees, supra note 5, at 46.
21. The participating banks have no direct cause of action against the borrower
Colocotronis. See note 8 supra, and accompanying text.
22. The agreement further stipulated that any losses incurred on the loan would be
shared pro rala. Telephone interview with Vincent K. Gilmore, counsel for United Virginia
Bank, in New York, Oct. 12, 1976. See Armstrong, supra note 6, at 45; Silverfeld, Participations-4 Brief Survey of the Case Law, 50 J. CoM. BANK LENDING, July 1968, at 43; and
Stivers, supra note 11, at 32, 34.
Participation agreements generally contain the lead bank's express disclaimer for the
legality, sufficiency, validity, enforceability and collectability of the loan, for the financial
condition of the borrower, and for the secured value of any collateral. Riggs, supra note 7, at
94-95. The lead bank generally disclaims any liability or responsibility for its administration
of the loan except for "bad faith or gross willful misconduct" and covenants only to handle
the participation with the same care and diligence as it would loans in which no participations were allotted. Isaac, Participationsand the Securities Laws, 58 J. COM. BANK LENDING,
Oct. 1975, at 50-52. The EAB agreements contained all of the above disclaimers and restrictions. Telephone interview with Vincent K. Gilmore, counsel for United Virginia Bank, in
New York, Oct. 12, 1976.
23. Unless the participating banks can qualify the loan participations as securities
under the Securities Acts, the only viable cause of action against the lead bank will be in
common law deceit. Relief in this situation depends primarily on whether the participant can
establish misrepresentation or failure to disclose certain material facts concerning the transaction. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86, § 106, at 69799, 707, 714, 722-23 (4th ed. 1971).
All of the suits brought include a cause of action under common law deceit. Under the
doctrine of pendant jurisdiction, a state action is recognized in a federal forum without independent jurisdictional support if it is joined with a claim involving a federal question and
arises out of the same transaction. 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3869-73 (2d ed. 1961,
Supp. 1969).
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25
Securities Act 24 and rule lOb-5.

Should the plaintiffs in the European-American Banking suits
successfully establish lead bank liability, the impact upon international finance will be widespread. Not only would it alter the basis
upon which much of world finance presently operates, but the current patterns of growth and development in international lending

would change dramatically.
After examining the facts and allegations surrounding the
pending European-American Banking suits, this comment will attempt to determine whether the loan participations sold to the
plaintiffs are securities 26 within the ambit of protection provided by
24. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976). Section 12(2) provides:
Any person who(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of
section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section),
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall
not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity
m any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
25. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) and rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) [hereinafter cited and referred to as
rule lOb-5]. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
The Supreme Court formally acknowledged an implied private right of action under
rule lOb-5 in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
See generally The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 52, 260-68 (1972). Prior to
this ruling, all of the federal circuit courts recognized an implied private right of relief. It has
been suggested by many that Congress never intended to grant a private cause of action but
that one resulted as a matter ofjudicial interpretation. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule J0b5."Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963). See also Klein, The
Extension ofa Private Remedy to Securities Investors Under SEC Rule I0b-5, 20 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 81 (1965); 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3869-73 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).

Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
26. This issue is to be distinguished from whether loan participations require registration under the Securities Act of 1933. At the present time loan participations are not required
to be registered under the registration and prospectus requirements contained in the 1933
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rule lOb-5 and section 12(2), and whether EAB, as lead bank, violated these antifraud provisions. Finally, attention will focus on the
anticipated impact upon the international lending system of making lead banks vulnerable to prosecution under rule lOb-5 and section 12(2).
I.

THE EUROPEAN-AMERICAN BANKING SUITS:
FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS

During the world tanker boom of 1972-1973, EAB, an investment company with commercial banking powers, made a number
of participation loans to various shipping companies under the ultimate ownership and control of the Colocotronis group.27 These
loans consisted of medium-term Euro-financing 28 arranged primarily to finance the purchase of two supertankers. 29 As a result of this
30
acquisition, and the sudden change in world petroleum demand,
Act. Mathews, supra note 4, at I, col. 6. The question of whether registration is required is
not determinative of the security status of the transaction.
To do so automatically excludes from the definition of security those transactions
which possess enough troublesome characteristics to require the liberal anti-fraud
protection but which also involve enough balancing safeguards (or too few additional worrisome characteristics) to eliminate the need for registration. An arrangement may well remain a security even though it is offered to a limited number of
informed and sophisticated investors so as to be able to be exempt from registration
or state approval.
Coffey, The Economic Realities ofa Security. Is There a More MeaningfulFormula?, 18 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 367, 372 (1967).
It appears possible that loan participations might well be exempt under the provisions
contained in § 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976). This section
provides that the securities of "any banking institution ... the business of which is substantially confined to banking and is supervised by the State . . . banking commission are exempt from the registration requirements." The court in Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central
National Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1969) recognized this exemption in regard to loan
participation agreements.
The prospect of requiring the registration of loan participations under the United States
securities laws is one of the bigger concerns facing the international lending market.
Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6. "To subject loan syndications to an expensive registration
process," according to C.P. Brauch, president of Chase Manhattan Bank's Chase Asia Ltd.,
"would kill the international syndication industry. It would certainly drive out the American
banks." Id.
27. The early 1970's represents a period when high powered international lending
financed an expanding "supertanker" market. See Betting of$20 Billion in the Tanker Game,
FORTUNE, Aug. 1974, at 145-49.
28. Banks UnderAttack, BANKER, Feb. 1976, at 109-10.
29. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1976, at 45, col. 6.
30. The over-ordering of supertankers during the early 1970's was based on two assumptions which turned out to be false and thus compounded each other. It was assumed
primarily that oil consumption would continue to grow in the late 1970's as it had done for
the previous 15 years; thus, a second assumption was made that the oil required would need
to be transported over very long distances. The quadrupling of oil prices confounded one
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the Colocotronis group remains in debt to the sum of 320 million
dollars. Most of this amount is owed to syndicates organized and
managed1 by EAB and its affiliate, Deutsche Schiffahrtsbank
3
(DSB).
With respect to ship lending participations, EAB's role as lead
bank is said to be unique in comparison with other types of partici-

pation loans. In view of the unique conditions in the shipping loan
market and in the shipping business, EAB is said to have represented itself as possessing the particular expertise required to evaluate, organize, and administer this kind of participation loan.32
Further, EAB is believed to have enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the Colocotronis group.3 3
EAB sold participations in separate loans to specific Colocoassumption; the increasing need to rely on sources of oil nearer to the place of consumption,

the North Sea, Alaska, and West Africa, confounded the other. Faith, How the World Tanker
Slump May Affect Bank's Balance Sheets, EUROMONEY, June 1976, at 14-15.
31. Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 110. EAB and DSB are both affiliates of the
Deutsche Bank. Id. It is believed that both banks consented to restructuring the loans because it appeared unlikely that they would be able to get their money back in today's market
if they foreclosed on the ships secured as collateral and sold them. Vessels valued at 50
million dollars three or four years ago are worth less than 15 million dollars today. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 13, 1976, at 45, col. 6. See also Barron's, June 2, 1975, at 32.
32. Allegations made by Republic National Bank of Dallas characterize this special
knowledge represented by EAB as one entailing a full understanding and appreciation of the
peculiarities of ship operations, charters, the multiplicity of laws relating to ship lending,
shipping, mortgages, assignments and other collateral, the special operating problems of
shipping, as well as the special techniques and experience required to analyze and evaluate
charters of vessels and, perhaps most importantly, to analyze facts and assumptions necessary to properly forecast revenue and expenses of a ship operating under charters. Complaints at 4, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-76-1002 (N.D.
Tex., filed Mar. 13, 1976).
This representation of "special knowledge" on the part of EAB becomes particularly
interesting when viewed in the light of two observations made on the world tanker glut: "It is
now generally agreed that many banks bulging with liquidity in 1972-73 made far too many
loans which were not properly secured and on the basis of too little experience [in] shipping
finance." Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6, col. 3. "The main point . . .is whether
international banks were rash in their commitments to ship owners during the tanker boom
.... It is true that they could not foresee the Middle Eastern war of 1973 and all of its
consequences; but they should perhaps have noticed that they were helping to finance a
world tanker surplus which is expected to last until 1980." Faith, supra note 30, at 110.
Note that this allegation of "special knowledge" will have particular importance in establishing the loan participation agreements as securities. See note 121 infra. As well, it is of
integral importance in determining the reliance and scienter elements requisite to rule lob-5
liability. See note 132 infra.
33. Complaint at 5, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-761002 (N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 18, 1976). This is supported by the fact that EAB and DSB, both
affiliates of Deutsche Bank, contributed approximately 70% of the 320 million dollars in
loans that remain outstanding by the Colocotronis group. Banks Under Attack, supra note
28, at 110.
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tronis companies," each loan constituting a separate group, or syndicate.3 5 In organizing each syndicate, EAB typically prepared and
circulated written, telexed, or cabled offering circulars. These circulars were preceded and followed by telephone communications.36
Telephone communications between the proposed participant
and EAB purportedly entailed an in-depth discussion of the transaction. After a short period a decision would be made by the proposed participant to either purchase the participation or reject the
lead's offer. Often, documentation of the deal would follow, the
to rely on EAB to
participant bank with no apparent choice but 37
transaction.
the
document
and
properly handle
Throughout the entire negotiation process, EAB allegedly held
itself out to the proposed participants directly, as well as impliedly
and through the course of dealings, as being an expert in every respect of ship lending, particularly in regard to the Colocotronis
companies and the Colocotronis group.3 8 Offering circulars sent to
proposed participants allegedly characterized the financial conditions of the Colocotronis companies and the Colocotronis group as
"excellent and in proper shape to support the loans."3 9
In connection with these representations, EAB periodically
published reports concerning the operations of the Colocotronis
companies. These reports included financial data and an analysis of
the ship charters and their operations - all of which was purportedly based upon careful research and analysis.'
34. These loans were secured by a mortgage on a single vessel, assignment of charter
hire, insurance claims relating to the vessel, and guaranty by the shareholders of the individual borrowing companies who are the principal shareholders of the parent entities controlling all shipping companies within the Colocotronis group. Answer to the Complaint, United
Virginia Bank v. European American Bank, No. 2137 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 21, 1976).
35. Complaint at 6, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-761002 (N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976).
36. Offering circulars serve as the principal document for interesting other banks in
taking part in the participation loan. Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6.
37. Complaint at 7, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-761002 (N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976).
38. In particular EAB is said to have represented itself as a highly knowledgeable ship
lender with equally sufficient knowledge of the financial condition of the companies and the
Colocotronis family, the status of their trade debt, insurance and charters, and the condition
of the vessels. Complaint at 6, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 376-1002 (N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976).
39. Complaint at 37, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-761002 (N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976).
40. The third annual study of the Colocotronis group of shipping companies, issued by
EAB in April, 1975, and sent to all participants, contains the following in its introductory
statement: "This report... reflects the continuing efforts of both the Colocotronis group
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EAB's loans to the Colocotronis companies total over 110 million dollars and are broken up for the most part into separate loans

to individual shipowning companies, each of which owns one
4
ship. '
As a result of EAB's solicitations, and on the basis of informa-

tion contained in offering circulars furnished to proposed participants, thirty United States banks joined several EAB syndicates in
providing loans that remain unpaid, and hence are the subject of
the pending suits.4 2 In connection with its sale of certain participations in particular loans, EAB allegedly deceived, manipulated, and
intentionally defrauded the plaintiffs and others, all in violation,
inter alia, of rule 1Ob-5 and section 12(2). 43 Purportedly, EAB not
only made false statements of material facts, but it omitted to state
facts which misled the participants." More specifically, EAB allegedly misrepresented the structuring of various loans, and overstated
the projected charter income from operations of the ships and the
net revenue or cash flow available to service the various loans.4 5
The offering circulars sent to proposed participants allegedly
concealed the true financial condition of the Colocotronis group.
EAB stated that the financial condition, assets, and charters of the
various Colocotronis companies, as parties to different loans, were
more than sufficient to support the respective loans.46 EAB further represented the Colocotronis group as sufficiently affluent to
and EAB to keep the groups' bankers informed on the operations and prospects of the group
as well as the environment in which it operates."
41. At least two of the Colocotronis companies are servicing and management companies. One is based in London, England; the other in Pireaus, Greece. Each of the loans was
usually secured by a First Preferred Ship Mortgage, usually recorded under Greek law in
Greece as the ships were Greek flag ships. The loans were made under agreements which
designate English law as applicable. In many cases the shipowning companies are Panamanian corporations. Complaint at 28, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No.
CA 3-76-1002 (N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976).
42. See note 17 supra.
43. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-76-1002
(N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976); Complaint, United Virginia Bank v. European American
Bank, No. 9814 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 5, 1975); Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6; and Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6, col. 5.
44. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-76-1002
(N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976); Complaint, United Virginia Bank v. European American
Bank, No. 9814 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 5, 1975); Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6; and Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6, col. 5.
45. Common allegations made by all plaintiffs involved in the European-American
Banking Suits. Mathews, supra note 4, at 6, col. 1.
46. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA-3-76-1002
(N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976); Complaint, United Virginia Bank v. European American
Bank, No. 9814 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 5, 1975).
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serve as guarantor for the loans.4 7 During a period when participations were being sold in certain loans, EAB and DSB were negotiating a substantial multimillion dollar working capital loan to the
Colocotronis companies.4 8 EAB failed to inform participants of this
fact at, or prior to, the sale of the participation. 9
Participants now bringing suit against EAB say they were misled into believing that the charter income of the supertankers they
financed for the Colocotronis group would be used to repay the
loans.50 EAB apparently represented that pre-existing charter
agreements had been made when, in fact, it appears quite to the
contrary. 5 ' Representations made by EAB in regard to the high
standard of care and competence exercised during the analysis,
credit evaluation, management, and administration of the shipping
loans and credits are also in issue.52

II.

THE

EAB

LOAN PARTICIPATION CERTIFICATES AS
SECURITIES

Determining whether the loan participation certificates sold by
defendant EAB constitute securities for the purposes of rule lOb-5
and section 12(2) is of primary importance in the pending European-American Banking suits. This determination is crucial because the preliminary task in every case seeking to invoke liberal
antifraud protections created by the securities laws requires establishing the existence of some "security" that is the object of the activities in question. 53 The statutory definition of the term
47. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-76-1002
(N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976); Complaint, United Virginia Bank v. European American
Bank, No. 9814 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 5, 1976); See Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6; and
Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6.
48. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA-3-76-1002
(N.D. Tex., fied Mar. 12, 1976); Complaint, United Virginia Bank v. European American
Bank, No. 9814 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 5, 1975).
49. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-76-1002,
at 45 (N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976).
50. Id.
51. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA-3-76-1002
(N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976); Complaint, United Virginia Bank v. European American
Bank, No. 9814 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 5, 1975). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1976, at 45,
col. 6.
52. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-76-1002
(N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976); Complaint, United Virginia Bank v. European American
Bank, No. 9814 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 5, 1976); See Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6; and
Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6.
53. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1975). The antifraud protection afforded under federal law is generally greater than that enjoyed by a
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"security," as provided by section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, includes "any certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement. . . or investment contract
• . .or participation in any [note]." 54
The question of loan participation certificates as securities has
faced the courts on two prior occasions. In Lehigh Valley Trust Co.
v. CentralNationalBank,5 the court, finding the loan participation
comparable action for common law deceit. See note 23 supra. A federal action, by the terms
of section 12(2) and rule 10b-5, reaches factual omissions and half-truths as well as actual
misrepresentations. See notes 24-25 supra. In contrast, common law fraud consists only of
active misrepresentations and, ordinarily, there is no imposition on the actor of a duty to
voluntarily disclose information. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105,
at 685-86, § 106, at 697-99, 707, 714, 722-23 (4th ed. 1971).
Moreover, two essential elements of common law fraud, reliance and causation, are
significantly relaxed under rule lOb-5 and section 12(2). In "omission" cases, as opposed to a
federal action for "misrepresentation," reliance is presumed where the materiality of the
omitted information is established. See text accompanying note 134 infra. Although proof of
causation remains an essential prerequisite to establishing liability under rule 10b-5, doubt
exists as to what degree proximate causation must be shown. 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3880-83 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969). As for section 12(2), the plaintiff need not prove
causation to recover. See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d
680, 696 (5th Cir. 1971); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970). But cf.Jackson v. Oppenheim, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,497, at 99,529-30 (2d Cir. 1976) (in order for an action for fraud to
exist under § 12(2), a communication must be instrumental in the sale).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1976). The full text reads:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture
certificiate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate, or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt of warrant or right to subscribe to purchase
any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, of banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Section 2(I) of the Securities Act provides that:
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976).
Although distinctions have been noted between the definitions provided in the two acts,
the judiciary has recognized them to be "virtually identical." United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342
(1967). See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
55. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969). Central National, appellant Florida Bank, sold Lehigh
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certificate to be within the parameters of section 3(a)(10), held the
lead bank liable for nondisclosure and material misrepresentation
under rule lOb-5. Based on the Supreme Court's policy of giving a
broad reading to the definition of security, 56 and its generally expansive construction of the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act,5 7
the Lehigh court read the statute literally to include the participation within the security category.58
However, stronger and conceptually more viable grounds than
those used by Lehigh exist for supporting the conclusion that a loan
participation constitutes a security.59 In NBI Mortgage Investment
Valley, appellee Pennsylvania Bank, a participation agreement in a loan originated by the
former. The loan was guaranteed by certain individuals and secured by shares of stock in
another company. Central National represented the debtor and the guarantors on the loan to
be "outstanding citizens" and "high" type individuals. Lehigh Valley relied on these representations in purchasing the loan participation from Central National. The Florida Bank
failed to disclose a number of significant facts. When the loan subsequently became uncollectable, Lehigh sued Central National under rule lOb-5 alleging misrepresentation and failure to disclose. 1d. at 90-91.
56. Id. at 992. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
57. 409 F.2d at 992. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
58. The Lehigh court substantiated its holding by stating that the definition of a security has been "literally read by the judiciary to the extent that almost all notes are held to be
securities." 409 F.2d at 991-92. Therefore, since the definition of a security includes any
certificate of participation in a note, and in view of the strict interpretation given to "any
note," the court held that it was bound to read the rest of the statute literally, and thus
concluded that the loan participation constituted a security. Id. at 992.
This view was subsequently criticized by the court in Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot,
379 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The statement made by the Lehigh court was depicted as
"an inaccurate summary of the views of the entire judiciary." Id. at 154. However, the 4venue court went on to state that "while the note itself in Lehigh may not be a security, a loan
participation agreement in the note is." Id See United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 849 n. 14 (1975) ("with the exception of the Second Circuit, every Court of Appeals
recently to consider the issue has rejected the literal approach").
59. The impact of the Lehigh decision was to allow for the recognition that a loan
participation may be a security. See Epstein, Bank Participation Agreements as Securities, 87
BANKING L.J. 99 (1970). However, in view of judicial developments in this area of the law,
the continuing viability of Lehigh, in so far as its holding was based on a literal reading of
the definition of a security, becomes questionable. See note 57 supra. Lehigh's literal approach has been rejected, and the courts have recognized that not all notes constitute securities. See, e.g., Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976); McClure
v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); and Lino
v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973). The pertinent definitional language of
both acts appears to be explicit by the inclusion of the term "any note" to include all notes.
See note 53 supra. Hence, the courts rejecting the Lehigh approach were confronted with the
problem of how Congress, by providing its broad definiton for the term "security," and by
allowing for only tightly drawn exceptions for particular types of notes, could not have intended for almost all notes to be securities. See, e.g., Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.,
321 F. Supp. 806, 808-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971). The courts
resolved this problem by giving legal impetus to the statutes' definitional preface, which
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Corp. v. Chemical Bank,6" the defendant's motion for partial sum-

mary judgment was dismissed on the grounds that "a loan participation may be a security if the transaction was coupled with the
necessary indicia under the Howey test."6 The language used by
this court is clearly in line with the Supreme Court's adoption of
the "context-over-text" approach in determining whether a specific

instrument or transaction constitutes a security within the meaning
of section 3(a)(10).6 2
This concept embodies the basic principles established by the
Supreme Court in SEC v. WJ Howey Co. ,63 and later reaffirmed
in Tcherepnin v. Knight.64 Under the so-called Howey test,65 courts

first are to be guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction
that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate

its purpose.6 6 Second, "in searching for the meaning and scope of
provides for application of the federal law "unless the context otherwise requires." See note
53 supra and note 61 infra.
60. NBI Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,632, at 90,145 (1976) (the only case after Lehigh to consider
the question of whether a loan participation is a security).
61. Id. at 90,147. See note 68 infra.
62. The term "context over text" is derived from the single introductory clause which
prefaces both section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act and section 2(!) of the 1933 Act: "unless the
context otherwise requires." See note 53 supra. Initially the Supreme Court prescribed the
context over text method to construe the definition of the term "security" within the purview
of the 1933 Act:
[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read the text in the light of context and will interpret the text so
far as the meaning of the words fairly permits as to carry out in particular cases the
generally expressed legislative intent.
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Co., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). See C.N.S. Enterprises v. G. &
G. Enterprises, 508 F.2d 1354, 1357 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Avenue
State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250, 253 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The definition of a security,
as provided for in both acts, is judicially recognized to be the same. See note 53 supra. The
use of the context over text approach has been considerably long standing, and is recognized
as an approach attuned to economic realities. United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 846-48 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
63. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The SEC sued to enjoin W.J. Howey Co. from using the mails
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce in the offer and sale of alleged unregistered and
nonexempt securities in violation of the 1933 Act. Howey owned citrus groves in Florida,
which it offered and sold small interests in; these land sale contracts were coupled with long
term service contracts which allowed Howey to operate the property exclusively and provided that the interest holders would share pro rata in Howey's annual profits. Id. at 296.
Thus, the issue in Howey turned upon a determination of whether, under the circumstances,
the land sales contract, the warranty deed, and the service contract together constituted a
security within the meaning of the 1933 Act.
64. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
65. See note 69 infra.
66. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). The Securities Act and the Securi-
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the word 'security' in the Acts, form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be placed on economic reality."6 7
In order to determine the essential economic characteristics
that create a need for the special antifraud protection afforded by
the 1934 Act, the Howey test must be used to distinguish a securities trangaction from a regular commercial transaction. This classic

test, set down by the Supreme Court in 1946, and adopted by subsequent courts when faced with this problem, 68 focuses on "[w/hether
the scheme involves an investment of money ina common enterprise
premised on a reasonable expectation ofprofits to be derivedfrom the
69
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.
ties Exchange Act clearly fall within the category of remedial legislation. One of the central
purposes of the Federal Securities Acts is to protect investors through the requirement of full
disclosures by issuers of securities; thus, the definition of security provided for under the Acts
necessarily determines the classes of investments and investors which will receive federal
protection. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-49 (1974); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293. 298-99
(1945).
67. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1974); Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). As was stated by the court in United Housing Foundation: "Because securities transactions are economic in character Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction and not on
the name appended thereto." 421 U.S. 837, 849.
68. The Howey test was applied by the Supreme Court in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332 (1967), and later reaffirmed in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837 (1975). For lower court decisions utilizing the Howey test, see, e.g., Daniel v. Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,98 S.Ct. 1232 (1978)
(No. 77-752); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974); El
Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co.,
487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th
Cir.),cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
69. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (emphasis
added). The original test prescribed by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. was
written in the context of whether the contracts between the parties were "investment contracts" and hence securities subject to the federal securities laws. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
The Howey Court stated: "The test for [an investment contract] is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others." Id. at 299. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967). Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in United Housing Foundation, extended the Howey test to
encompass not only those essential economic attributes of investment contracts, but also
those salient features of all securities:
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all
of the Court's decisions defining a security. The touchstone is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to
be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.
421 U.S. at 852. The Court, in reformulating the Howey test, replaced the "solely from the
efforts of others" requirement with the "entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others" requirement. In so doing, it appears that the United HousingFoundation Court precluded promoters from eluding the reach of the Securities Acts by involving their investors in some
insignificant way, without permitting those investors to have any actual managerialinput in

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1978

15

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1978], Art. 10
LOAN PARTICIPATIONS AS SECURITIES

Accordingly, it is appropriate to distinguish the investment
characteristics involved in the transactions between defendant EAB
and the plaintiffs from the qualities of commercial lending that
would inevitably free EAB from liability under rule lOb-5. Therefore, a complete analysis of the circumstances surrounding the sale
of loan participation certificates by EAB under the scrutiny of the
Howey test is imperative."
The Howey test is comprised of four identifiable elements: (1)
an investment; (2) a common enterprise; (3) a reasonable expectation of profits; and (4) the derivation of profits from the promotional or managerial efforts of others. Each element will be
considered in its corresponding order.
A.

The Investment Element

Although the participating banks advanced substantial sums of
money to EAB upon the promise of a fixed return, the plaintiffs
must show that the advancement made to EAB was in the nature of
an investment, and not in the plaintiffs' capacity as commercial
lenders. 7 ' The argument can be made that in reality no difference
exists between the initial issuance of the shipping loans, which is a
commercial transaction,7 2 and the sale of participations at a later
date. This, however, overlooks several important distinctions.
Though the underlying loans, pursuant to which the participations
were sold, may not be an investment, that factor alone does not
determine the status of the loan participation certificates.7 3 The
underlying loans and the loan participations are to be considered
the enterprise. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481-83 (9th
Cir.), cer. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
70. Defendant EAB denies that any of the participations or participation agreements
are securities. Answer to Complaint, United Virginia Bank v. European American, No. 3137
(S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 2, 1976). By contending that the sale of loan participations does not
constitute a sale and purchase of securities within the purview of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
EAB challenges the jurisdictional basis upon which this action is founded.
71. See, e.g., Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (9th Cir.
1976); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 493-95 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1112 n.3, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1974);
Lino v. City Investment Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694-96 (3d Cir. 1973); and Avenue State Bank v.
Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250, 254 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
72. See, e.g., Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976);
Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974). But see Exchange Nat'l Bank v.
Touche Ross and Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976); and Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F.
Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973).
73. See, e.g., Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250, 251 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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individually; each constitutes a separate transaction.7 4 Congress intended that the term "security," as used in the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, should embody a
flexible, rather than a static, principle; one capable of adaptation to
meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek
to use the money of others on the promise of profits.7 5

The purchasers of participations acquired none of the legal
rights characteristic of the creditor-debtor relationship established
between EAB and the Colocotronis companies.7 6 Participants did
not receive interest in property taken as collateral to secure the
loan.7 7 Furthermore, the participating lenders acquired no contractual rights against EAB in the event of mismanagement, insolvency,
or the borrower's subsequent default.78 As the lead bank, EAB offered proposed participants an opportunity to contribute money
and share in the profits of large participation loans managed and
74. Id. This distinction is of ultimate importance to the plaintiffs' action for, with few
exceptions, the courts have ruled that notes given by borrowers to banks in commercial loan
transactions are not securities. See, e.g., Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252
(9th Cir. 1976); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Bellah v. First National Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir.
1974); City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp. 592, 608 (W.D. Ark. 1968), aft'd,
422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,399 U.S. 905 (1970). But see Exchange National Bank v.
Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976); Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp.
490 (D. Utah 1973). This distinction was noted by the Lehigh court in stating that the lead
bank was "not charged with the sale of the Larso Development note, but rather with the sale
of the loan participation." 409 F.2d at 992. In rejecting the Lehigh court's use of the literal
approach, the court in Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
held that an ordinary commercial note is not a security. Id. at 255. Confronted with the
Lehigh court's statement that almost all notes are securities, the Tourtelot court observed the
essential factual distinction found in Lehigh in stating that although "the note itself in Lehigh may not be a security. . . , a loan participation agreement in the note is." Id. at 254.
Hence, both courts recognized the original note, and the subsequent loan participation sold
in the note, as separate instruments, and that as such, the status of one is not determinative of
the status of the other.
75. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-49, 851-52 (1974);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 29798 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). See S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1933).
76. See note 7 supra.
77. Under the EAB loan participation agreement, participants receive proportionate
shares in secured collateral only upon foreclosure by EAB. Until that time, a participant has
no interest in any property taken as security. Telephone interview with Vincent K. Gilmore,
counsel for United Virginia Bank, in New York City, Oct. 12, 1976. See also Armstrong,
supra note 6, at 50-51; Simpson, supra note 8, at 1977-1979.
78. Under the EAB loan participation agreements, EAB has disclaimed all liability except for that which could arise in an instance of bad faith or wilful misconduct. See note 22
supra.
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controlled solely by the defendant.7 9 In its capacity as the lead
bank, EAB received not only a substantial commitment fee from
the borrower for each participation loan arranged, but EAB also

received a management fee for administering and servicing the in-:
dividual loans.8"
EAB solicited banks, widely distributed throughout the United

States and Europe,8 ' that purportedly lacked the financial sophistication and expertise required in making shipping loans.82 When
participants advanced money to EAB in purchasing participations,
they provided the capital necessary for EAB to operate in its capacity as the lead bank.83 Beyond advancing their share of the loan
proceeds, participant banks had no active role in loan surveillance
or management; the only purpose for their participating interest in
the loans was to receive the expected return of their initial investment and their share of the profits.8 4 Therefore, a strong argument
79. None of the participating banks possess the special expertise required to arrange
and manage the shipping loan participations. EAB allegedly did. See note 32 supra, and
accompanying text. See SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1945); SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 349 (1943).
80. Telephone interview with Vincent K. Gilmore, Counsel for United Virginia Bank,
in New York City, Oct. 12, 1976. See Lees, supra note 5, at 45-46 & n.12.
The EAB managerial fee arrangement can be likened to the service contract in SEC v.
W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1945). In line with Howey, it is therefore to be contended
that EAB, as loan manager, must essentially fulfill its obligation in that capacity with adequate personnel and equipment if the participants are to achieve their paramount aim of a
return on their investment. Id. at 300.
81. Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6. Assuming that the absence of a creditordebtor relationship, between the participants and the borrower, does not necessarily indicate
the presence of an investment, it becomes important to observe that the courts have emphasized an offering made to a class of investors in finding notes to be securities. See, e.g.,
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1362-63 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); McClure v. First National Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975). Congressional concern with the potential for fraud
when interest in an enterprise is offered and sold to those seeking an investment opportunity
mandates that such emphasis should be given by the judiciary. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). In view of the fact that EAB solicited the participation of the
plaintiffs, and in recognizing the managerial and administrative responsibilities of these
loans as solely resting upon EAB, the role of the plaintiffs becomes passive in nature, and can
well be considered that of an investor. See notes 32 and 80 supra, and note 83 infra.
82. See notes 32 and 77 supra; Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6; Mathews, supra
note 4, at 1, col. 6.
83. The lead bank is responsible for organizing the syndicate as well as for handling
and negotiating all terms of the original underlying loan. Once the loan is made and participations are sold, the lead bank administers the loan and bears the responsibility of insuring
that the loan provisions are observed. Lees, supra note 9, at 46-47. The lead bank enjoys the
liberty to restructure the loan at any time without the prior consent or knowledge of participants. Curan, supra note 7, at 63; Riggs, supra note 7, at 94-95.
84. This factor clarifies the economic realities of the transaction by indicating that the
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can be made that such a transaction constitutes an investment. 85
In view of the investment character of loan participations, a
policy argument can be made on the grounds that the securities
laws only provide protection for innocent, uninformed investors
who buy and sell securities from well-informed, knowledgeable investment institutions. Since the purchasers and the seller involved

were banks with considerable investment expertise that were dealing at arm's length, the purchaser arguably should not be accorded
the protection afforded to an unsophisticated investor.86
However, this policy argument has neither statutory87 nor case
law authority. 88 Neither Congress nor the Securities Exchange
Commission has indicated that the unsophisticated and unwary
alone are provided the protection of rule lOb-5 and section 12(2).89
"Fraud also may be perpetrated upon the powerful and the sophisticated."'
B.

The Common Enterprise Element

Once the investment character of a transaction is established,
the analysis turns its attention to the element of common enterprise.
Common enterprise arises from the interweaving of economic interests. 9 ' The requisite of "commonality" is established in the case
plaintiffs' position was created for one purpose: to participate in earnings resulting from the
use of their funds. Thus, the transaction could well be classified as one of investment. United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 339 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 349 (1943). See note 15 Supra, and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., cases cited in note 81 supra.
86. This argument was presented without success to the Lehigh court by defendant
Central National. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 992-93
(5th Cir. 1969). This same policy argument will also be made in the pending EAB suits.
Mathews, supra note 4, at 18, col. 2.
87. The (Securities Exchange) Act (of 1934) makes no general exception for transactions between financial institutions . . . . [T]hat Congress made no express general exemption for banks under the fraud provisions of either the Securities Act of
1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 indicates that Congress did not intend
any such exemption.
Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1969).
88. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 1064, 1073 (7th Cir. 1975);
Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 683 (5th Cir.
1971); Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
89. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir.
1969).
90. Id Cf. Roquemore v. Ford Motor Co., 400 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1968) (brother's
breach of fiduciary duty to his principal corporation).
91. Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality & Risk to Defning Federal
Securities,25 HAST. L.J. 219, 236 (1974). This is in accord with the view expressed in SEC v.
Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,474 U.S. 821 (1973): "A
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of loan participations because the participants' financial interests
are inextricably intermeshed with those of EAB.92 The participants,
as a group, are dependent upon the efforts of the lead bank in making and administering a sound loan, and on the success of the borrower in repaying the loan.93 The value furnished by participants is
subject to all the risks of the enterprise pro rata. Correspondingly,
the percentage of total profits to be anticipated by a participant is
based on the ratio of value the participant supplied to the total
value of the loan. 9a Generally, any multibank loan retains the aspects of commonality,9" and perhaps the circumstances of the EAB
participation, and the manner in which they operate, more adequately establish the existence of a common enterprise than most
multibank loans or a true lending syndicate.96
C. The Expectation of Profits Element

Once the plaintiffs establish that the transaction between the
lead and participant banks was one involving the "investment of
money in a common enterprise,"97 the profit element follows the
implied fact that a reasonable expection of profit accompanies the
decision of a bank to join the lending syndicate. 98 "Profits" has
been interpreted to mean a participation in earnings resulting from
the use of the investor's funds.99 The designation of profits as fixed
serves merely to identify the type of profit anticipated.1°° Profits
fixed in terms of interest do not make it any less of a profit. '0
common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and

dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties."
Id. at 482 n.7. See Continental Market Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967) for an
exhaustive discussion of the common enterprise element.
92. See notes 7, 8 & 1I supra, and accompanying text.
93. See note 80 supra.

94. Riggs, supra note 7, at 94-95.
same stipulations. Telephone interview
Virginia Bank, in New York City, Oct.
Silverfeld, supra note 22, at 43; Stivers,
95.
2.19(10).
96.
97.

The EAB participation agreements contained the
with Mr. Vincent K. Gilmore, counsel for United
12, 1976. See also Armstrong, supra note 6, at 49;
supra note 11, at 32, 34.

See generally 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §
See also Armstrong, supra note 6, at 46-50.
See note 7 supra.
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975), quoting SEC v.

W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
98. See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
99. United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967).

100. See, e.g., Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th
Cir. 1960).
101. Id.
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Even if the expectation of profits did not accompany the plaintiffs' decision to join in the participation, it is possible that the concept of risk capital °2 will be recognized in its place."0 3 The risk
capital concept focuses on the type and degree of risk allocated to
the investor." If the investor bears the principal risk of loss for
capital supplied to the venture, and if that risk is contingent upon
the managerial efforts of the promoter, then, for the purpose of the
antifraud protection afforded under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the
transaction is deemed qualified as a security. 0 5
A direct relationship exists between the success of the enterprise and the preservation or deterioration of the value which loan
participants originally furnished. Prior to every participation loan
being made to the Colocotronis group, EAB granted participations
in the loan and formed its respective syndicate group. 016 The participating banks were initially allocated the principal risk of loss for
their investment.' 7 As lead bank, EAB handled all negotiations regarding the loan terms, loan documentation, and the securing of
collateral.10 8 Once a loan was made, EAB had the sole responsibil102. The "risk capital" approach was first articulated by the California Supreme Court
in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). See generally
Coffey, supra note 26, at 367; Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the
Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 167 (1971); Hannan & Thomas,
supra note 91, at 242-49.
103. The Supreme Court recognized the risk capital approach in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 887 (1975), but since this concept did not apply to the situation at
hand, the Court did not comment on the validity of the risk capital approach. Id. at 857 n.
24. Prior cases have displayed elements of risk and risk capital analysis. See SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuities which placed all investment
risks on the annuitant were held to be securities); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943) (oil leaseholds sold as a promotion scheme to raise capital to drill the well
held to be securities since investors responsible for financing the venture would bear the risk
of loss); SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S.
821 (1973) (self-improvement contracts held to be securities where the purchaser's risk of loss
was contingent on the seller's selling scheme and selling efforts). See also Hannan &
Thomas, supra note 91, at 242-49.
104. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal.2d 811, 814, 361 P.2d 906, 908 (1961).
Cf. El Khadem v. Equities Securities Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,419 U.S.
900 (1974) (note held to be a security).
105. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908 (1961).
See generallyCoffey, supra note 26, at 381-94; Hannan & Thomas, supra note 91, at 242-49.
106. Telephone interview with Mr. Vincent K. Gilmore, counsel for United Virginia
Bank, in New York City, Oct. 12, 1976. Loan participations arranged in this way are known
as the best effort syndicate. The lead bank agrees to make the loan only if the necessary
number of participations are purchased. Failure to sell results in withdrawal of the offer, and
the borrower is forced to seek funds from another source. Lees, supra note 5, at 47.
107. See note 22 supra.
108. See notes 8, 32 & 83 supra.
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ity of loan management. 109

In substance, EAB, as the promoter, conducted its business of
making commercial loans with the participants' money and at the
participants' risk. The analysis of the EAB transaction under the
capital risk approach indicates that this method is a viable alternative for any plaintiffs unable to establish the requisite element of
"profits."
D.

ManagerialEfforts Element

The finding of profit expectation leads to the final prong of the
Howey test which requires that the investor's profit come from the
managerial efforts of others. "The Securities Acts are designed to
protect those who are not in the position to protect their own investment."1 0 Unlike a multibank loan arrangement where each member of the syndicate appears equally on all loan documentation and
can fend for itself,"' the participants in the EAB loans had no alternative but to accept the terms negotiated by the lead lender and
rely on its credit evaluation and loan administration. 1 2 As a general rule, participant banks have no access whatsoever to the borrower and are unable to conduct their own credit and investment
109. See note 80 supra.
110. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295 (1946).
111. Each member of the lending syndicate has a proportionate right not only to determine the terms under which the loan will be made, but also to participate as co-manager.
See notes 7 and II supra. The agreement between the co-lending banks carries the characteristics of a joint venture. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 46, 50; Strivers, supra note 11, at 3234. A joint venture, by definition, is generally formed to carry out a particular venture. The
essential ingredients of a joint venture are: (1)agreement between the parties (express or
implied); (2) right to share in profits made; (3) joint interest; and (4) a mutual right to control.
H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 49, at 78 (2d ed. 1970). Since each participant in a true
multibank syndicate attains the status of co-manager, the element of "managerial efforts of
others" appears to be lacking. Hence, it appears questionable whether the existence of a
security could be established in a true multibank syndicate. But see Long, supra note 102, at
135.
112. EAB acted as the entrepreneur of the entire lending scheme; it solicited from the
participants the capital needed to support the actual loan, as well as negotiated the loan
terms and directly managed the loan with the borrower. See 91 BANKING L.J. 767 (1974).
The lead bank, further, has complete discretion with respect to the exercise or refraining
from the exercise of any rights granted to it in its credit arrangements with the borrower; no
responsibility enures from the lead bank to the participants as a result of this exercise of
discretion. Riggs, supra note 7, at 94-95.
An analogy is to be drawn between this situation and that found in Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). There, withdrawable capital shares in a state chartered savings
and loan association were held to be securities; the Court found the petitioners to be "participants in a common enterprise; a money lending operation dependent for its success upon the
management of City Savings in making sound loans." Id. at 338. But see Epstein, supra note
58, at 102.
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analysis. 13 The plaintiffs cannot be charged with constructive
knowledge of the borrower Colocotronis' financial condition since
this Greek company is a privately owned foreign corporation for
which no public financial information exists.I"a In this case, even if
a participating bank were to employ outside consultants and advisors, it could never put itself in the position of the informed lead
lenders who work closely with the borrower in developing and supervising the loans. 5 Furthermore, the United States banks participating in the loans are located in various parts of the country." 6
Thus, the participants had no choice but to rely on EAB, as lead
lender, for their credit evaluation and their ability to negotiate loan
convenants and restrictions. Subsequent to the purchase of participations and the loan being made, reliance on EAB necessarily continues for loan surveillance and administration."I 7 This common
enterprise managed by EAB required an adequate staff and the
proper exercise of care if the participants were to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investment." 8 Allegedly, EAB's
staff was grossly inadequate, resulting in a failure, on the part of
EAB, to exercise the requisite care necessary to accomplish this
goal. 119
The finding of a common enterprise fulfills the four-element
requirement necessary to establish a profit seeking venture. The
participants, as investors, supply the capital and share in the profits
while EAB manages, controls, and operates the enterprise. It follows that the arrangements whereby the investors' interests were
made manifest involved investment contracts, regardless of the le113. "Only the very biggest banks have the staff and money to verify information contained in the offering circulars." Mathews, supra note 4, at 18, col. 3. For additional factors
inducing the reliance of participants on the accuracy of information supplied by the lead
from
bank, see Thuleen, Survey of Practiceand ProcedureofBanks in Taking Participations
Correspondent Banks, 50 J. COM. BANK LENDING, May 1968, at 12, 13; Ways to Improve
Loan Participations,66 BANKING, Sept. 1974, at 140.
114. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-76-1002
(N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976).
115. See notes 13 and 14 5upra.
116. See note 17 supra.
117. This factor has been recognized as an important and necessary duty on the part of
the promoter. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943); see Coffey, supra note 26, at 396-98.
118. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Co., 320
U.S. 344 (1943); Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 905 (1961).
See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
119. Complaint, Republic Nat'l Bank v. European American Bank, No. CA 3-76-1002
(N.D. Tex., filed Mar. 12, 1976); Complaint, United Virginia Bank v. European American
Bank, No. 9814 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 5, 1976).
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gal terminology in which such contracts were clothed. Therefore, in
applying the Howey test, it may be argued that the participation
certificates purchased by the plaintiffs in connection with various
EAB loans constituted "securities" under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
III.

RULE

101-5 &

SECTION

12(2)

Assuming the participation certificates in the European-American Banking suits constitute securities protected by the antifraud
provisions of the United States securities laws, an issue is raised as
to whether EAB violated rule lOb-5 or section 12(2), or both. The
question of rule 1Ob-5 liability is addressed first.
Plaintiffs seeking recovery under rule lOb-5 must initially satisfy the Birnbaum121 "purchaser-seller" limitation sustained recently in the Blue Chp Stamps 2 1 decision. Rule lOb-5 prohibits
120. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). See note 122 supra,
and accompanying text.
121. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). There is no language
in either section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 which expressly provides for a private right of action for
persons injured by violations of those provisions. See note 25 supra. Federal courts implied
a private right of action under the provisions of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, and the
Supreme Court confirmed the existence of such a private right of action under the particular
circumstances found in Superintendent of Insurance v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971) and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). As noted by
the Court in its recent decision in Blue Chip Stamps, those two cases had confirmed such a
private right of action "with virtually no discussion" of the issue. 421 U.S. at 730.
In Blue Chip Stamps, the plaintiff, on the basis of misleading pessimistic statements in a
1933 Act registration statement, sought to assert a private remedy under rule lOb-5 on the
ground that he had been misled into not purchasing the securities being offered. Id. at 72627. Hence, in Blue Chip Stamps the Supreme Court was confronted for the first time with the
stark anomaly presented by the implication of a private right of action, not on behalf of
plaintiffs who were sellers of securities, as in both Superintendent and Affiliated Ute, but
rather for conduct which the express civil remedies of the 1933 Act addressed. Id. at 730.
At the outset, the Blue Chips Stamps Court noted that rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Citing the parallel antifraud provisions of
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which uses broader language, prohibiting fraud in
the offer or sale of securities, the Court noted that "[wlhen Congress wished to provide a
remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble doing so expressly." Id. at 734. The Court noted that the principal express nonderivative private civil
remedy provided under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act is limited expressly by its terms to
purchasers of securities, and concluded that the court would not impute to Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of action beyond the
bounds it delineated for a comparable express cause of action. Id. at 736. The Court also
cited the fact that in 1957, and again in 1959, the SEC had unsuccessfully sought to have
Congress amend the wording of section 10(b) to explicitly cover any attempt to purchase or
sell securities. Id. at 732. Thus, the Court found that no private right of action could be
implied under rule lOb-5 on behalf of such a plaintiff, who was not a "purchaser" or a
"seller" of securities.
Since its decision in Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a
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fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 122 The

plaintiffs in the EAB suits satisfy this requirement as evidenced by
their purchase of participations.
Once it is determined that a plaintiff satisfies the purchaserseller requirement, three basic elements are required in 1Ob-5 actions: (1) conduct by the defendant within the proscribed rule; (2) a

purchase or sale of securities by the plaintiff in connection with
pro23
scribed conduct; and (3) resultant damages to the plaintiff.
Within the first element of "proscribed conduct," several distinct factors of independent significance are subsumed. First, some
sort of fraud in the special 1Ob-5 sense of the word must have been
committed. 24 This alleged fraud must involve, according to rule
lOb-5 standards, "misleading or deceptive activities"'' 25 carried on
private right of action is not to be automatically implied under rule lOb-5 in all circumstances in which the rule has been allegedly violated. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462.
122. "[T]he plaintiff class for purposes of a private damage action under § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 [is] limited to actual purchasers and sellers of securities." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975), citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
123. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 93 (5th Cir. 1975); Sargent v.
Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 759 (5th Cir. 1974). Mere possession and nondisclosure of material facts do not alone create liability under rule lOb-5; there must be, in addition, some
relation which generates a duty to inform. Gold v. DCL, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123, 1127
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). The relationship between EAB and the plaintiffs, as seller and buyer, respectively, imposed a duty on EAB (at the time of the sale) to disclose all material information. See McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F. Supp. 84, 91 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
The extent of the duty of disclosure imposed upon EAB per the application of rule lOb5 is defined by the situation and knowledge of the parties at the time they committed themselves. Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972). Hence, the
scope of "material" information EAB was under a duty to disclose is to be ascertained in
light of the knowledge and circumstances of the parties at the time of the transaction. See
text accompanying notes 32-41 supra.
124. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1975). See, e.g.,
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515
F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); Kubik v. Goldfield, 479 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Galaxy
Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
In establishing guidelines by which the scope of a defendant's duty can be ascertained,
the courts have carefully recognized that the situation as it existed between the parties, and
respectively, their individual knowledge, and access to information are the controlling factors
by which the scope of a defendant's duty of disclosure is defined. Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Ark. 1972). Thus, if EAB's position as lead bank
lender placed it in a superior position in regard to its knowledge and access to information,
as opposed to that of the purchasing participating banks, EAB's status as lead bank will be of
obvious importance in defining its duty of disclosure. However, the real issue of fact necessary to resolve will be what information was known or readily available to EAB at the time
the sale of participations took place. See note 32 supra.
125. To establish a cause of action under rule lOb-5 there must be some sort of fraud or
deceit in the sale of securities. Miller v. San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc., 540 F.2d 807, 809
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in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Although rule
lOb-5 offers this guideline, it fails to specify particular acts or practices that constitute manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances.1 26 Rather, the rule is designed to encompass the infinite
127
variety of devices that are alien to the climate of fair dealing.
The essence of rule lOb-5 is that it requires disclosure of material

facts.' 28 Misrepresentations, half-truths, omissions, and concealment of after-acquired information are proscribed.1 13290 Implied rep-

resentations are also sufficient to establish liability.
The second component inherent in the first element of proscribed conduct is materiality.' 3 ' Thus, the misrepresentations or
omissions in question must be material in the sense that there exists
(5th Cir. 1976); Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v. Chuck Ruwart Chevrolet, Inc., 519 F.2d
317, 321 (10th Cir. 1975). Such deceptive or manipulative devices need not be precisely sufficient to sustain an action for common law fraud or deceit. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
905, 907 (1961). See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975); Keene Corp. v. Weber,
394 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); U.S. v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
126. Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), citing Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), and Drachman v.
Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972). See SEC v. Scott Gorman Municipals, Inc., 407 F.
Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975).
127. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bur., 375 U.S. 180, 201 (1963); accord, Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. The only regulatory objective of rule lOb-5 is that access to material information be
enjoyed equally, but this objective requires nothing more than the disclosure of basic facts so
that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative expertise in reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge equal to that of insiders. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1971); McGraw v. Matthaei, 388
F. Supp. 84, 91 (E.D. Mich. 1972). See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FR-AUDSEC
RULE 10B-5 (1971); L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS (2d ed. 1961); Hewitt, Developing
Concepts ofMaterialityand Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887 (1977); Castruccio, Developments in
Securities Regulations, 32 Bus. LAW. 1537 (1977); Anderson, The DisclosureProcessin Federal Securities Regulation. A BriefReview, 25 HAST. L. REV. 1340 (1966); Cohen, "Truth in
Securities'"-Revisited,79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
129. SEC v. National Banker's Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex.), aid.,
448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971). See Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under
Rule 10b-5, 42 FORD. L. REV. 243 (1973).
130. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 1064, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1975). See,
e.g., Ahrens v. American-Canadian Beaver Co., 458 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1972).
131. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1975). See
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v.
Central National Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969); Heit v. Weitzen, 402
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1971).
The concept of materiality in an action under section 10(b) and SEC rule lOb-5 since
materiality operates as a limit on the amount of information that must be disclosed under the
Securities Acts. Hewitt, supra note 128, at 890. The "question of materiality, it is universally
agreed, is an objective one, involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to
a reasonable investor." T.S.C. Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1977).
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a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would have considered them important in determining his choice of action in the
transaction involved.' 3 2 Where the material facts were misstated or
misrepresented, some evidence of reliance on the part of the investor must be established. 133 Positive proof of reliance is not a prereq132. Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir. 1977). The
concept of "materiality" has been said to suffer from a problem of definition; attempts at
definition often end in circularity, for example, a material fact is a fact "which would materially affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction." Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See Hewitt, supra note 128, at 888-909. As a result,
variations in the formulation of a general test of materiality occur in the articulation ofjust
how significant a fact must be or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact would
affect a reasonable investor's judgment. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438
(1977). The widespread confusion over the proper standard of materiality has recently been
resolved, however, by the Supreme Court's decision in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1977). In the context of a section 14(a), Securities Exchange Act action
for violation of the proxy disclosure requirements, the TSC Court adopted the following
standard of materiality:
[A fact] is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote. This standard. . . does not
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted [or misrepresented] fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the
standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the "total mix of information made available."
426 U.S. at 449. The courts have generally interpreted materiality in the same manner under
all of the various provisions of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (citing cases decided under rule lob-5 and 14a-9); Gilbert v.
Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970) (standards of materiality under section 12(2) and
rule lOb-5 considered the same). The TSC test of materiality was recently adapted to a rule
lOb-5 context by the Seventh Circuit in Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1048 (7th Cir. 1977).
The test of materiality is the same whether the facts to be considered are omissions or
misrepresentations. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 447, n.9 (1977) (the
test of materiality delineated in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972) is not the test to be used in cases of "omissions"). The issue of materiality of a nondisclosure or misrepresentation with respect to a security is one of the facts to be determined on
the basis of all of the circumstances. Gelnan v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 60, 68
(W.D. Pa. 1976); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1974); Radiation Dynamics,
Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1972) (materiality "must be determined on a
case-to-case basis according to the fact pattern of each specific transaction.")
133. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989,
993 (5th Cir. 1969); Reeder v. Mastercraft Electronics Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). The test ofjustifiable reliance under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is a subjective test
and not simply a reasonable man test. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967),cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). Plaintiffs sophistication, expertise, and business acumen in the
financial community, his access to information and opportunity to detect the fraud are all
relevant considerations to be made in determining a plaintiff's reliance. Clement A. Evans &
Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970). Requiring reliance as a prerequisite to recovery serves to restrict the potentially limitless thrust of rule lOb-5 to those situations in which
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uisite to recovery 34where the circumstances involve a material
failure to disclose. 1
Finally, as a result of the recent Supreme Court holding in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,135 proscribed conduct requires that sci136
enter necessarily be established on the part of the defendant.
The alleged misrepresentations and nondisclosures on the part
of EAB may come within the ambit of conduct if the plaintiffs' allethere exists causation in fact between the act and the injury. Tucker v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
134. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). Although the
Supreme Court's presumption of reliance in cases of omissions meets the conceptual difficulty of proof of reliance on a negative fact, that presumption is not held to be conclusive. As
was stated by the court in Chelsea Assoc. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975):
We do not read [the] decision [in Affiliated Ute Citizens] to say that the question of
reliance vel non may not be considered at all in non-disclosure cases, but only that
proof of reliance is not required for recovery. If defendant is able to demonstrate
that there was clearly no reliance, that is, that even if the material facts had been
disclosed, plaintiff's decision as to the transaction would not have been different
from what it was, then the non-disclosure cannot be said to have caused the subsequent loss, and under the ordinary principles of the law of fraud, recovery should
be denied. . . . However, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Affiliated Ute,
the burden of proof rests squarely upon defendant to establish the 'non-reliance' of
plaintiff. (citations omitted).
527 F.2d at 1271. See Note, The Reliance Requirement in PrivateActions Under SEC Rule
10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975).
Thus, where the materiality of an omission to disclose material facts is established in a
securities action, reliance is presumed, but nonreliance may be established as an affirmative
defense. Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir. 1977); Chelsea Assoc. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F.
Supp. 1057, 1077-79 (D. Del. 1976). See Wheeler, Plainti'sDuty of Due Care Under Rule
10b-5. An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 561 (1975); Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable' 72 COLUM. L. REV. 562,
567 (1972).
135. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
136. Id. at 193. The term "scienter" was interpreted to mean "a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at n.12.
The narrow issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether scienter is a necessary
element of an "aiding and abetting" violation of rule lOb-5. Nevertheless, the Ernst Court
framed the issue to cover all private causes of action for damages under section 10(b) and
rule 1Ob-5, thereby expanding the reach of the Ernst decision beyond the immediate facts.
Id. at 193. Commentators and case authorities have concurred that this result was the necessary outgrowth of the Court's desire to find one standard applicable in all rule lob-5 cases.
See Rutgers, Recklessness Under Section lob: Weathering the Hochfelder Storm, 8 CAMDEN
L.J. 325 (1977); Note, Rule 10b-5: Scienter Displacesthe Flexible Duty Standard,56 NEB. L.
REV. 382 (1977); Note, Scienter's Scope andApplication in Rule 10b-5 Actions. An Analysis in
Light of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1977).
The Ernst Court did not address the issue of whether, in some instances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
However, recent lower court decisions have deemed extreme instances of recklessness sufficient to predicate liability. See, e.g., Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc. 535 F.2d 982, 993-94 (7th
Cir. 1976); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,514 (1976).
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gations can be proven. Legislative intent and judicial interpretation
indicate that such omissions and misrepresentations of fact made
by a solicitor seeking to induce the purchase of securities are precisely the type of conduct the37antifraud provisions of rule 1Ob-5 are
designed to protect against. 1
Facts relating to the financial condition of the borrower,' 3 8
loan structure, and terms negotiated between EAB and the Coloco137. A fundamental purpose common to these securities regulation statutes is to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus achieve a
high standard of business ethics in the securities industry. SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.
1965); Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200, 1209 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
However, since the aim of rule lOb-5 is to qualify, as between insiders and outsiders,
the doctrine of caveat emptor, the courts have also recognized that the legislative enactment
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 did not establish a scheme of investors insurance. Lane v.
Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. at 1209. Accordingly, the class of investors to be
nrotectedtinder rule1 0b-5 is limited to cnnscint6n- h-vrc -nA -1llrc i. good faith. City
National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 n.10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200, 1209 (E.D. Ark. 1972). As a
means of promoting this principal limitation on the scope of lOb-5 plaintiffs who have satisfied the Birnbaum requirement, see notes 121 and 122 upra, the courts consider independently whether the carelessness of a plaintiff should preclude recovery. Hence, the due
diligence of the plaintiff is a separate element of a private cause of action for violation of rule
lOb-5. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc.,
540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976). See Wheeler, Plaint/'s Duty ofDue Care Under Rule JOb-.
An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 561 (1976); Note, The Due
Diligence Requirementfor Plaintifs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753 (1975).
The diligence of the plaintiff in a lOb-5 action is judged subjectively. Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir. 1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d
Cir. 1976). Thus, the duty of due diligence is imposed solely under the peculiar circumstances of each case, including existence of a fiduciary relationship, concealment of the
fraud, opportunity to detect it, as well as plaintiff's sophistication, expertise, business acumen
in the financial community, and knowledge of related proceedings. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551
F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir. 1977); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th
Cir. 1970); Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1963). See Rogen v. Ilikon
Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66
(E.D.N.Y. 1969). The due diligence test, as applied by the courts, measures the plaintiff's
conduct against that of a reasonable investor with the attributes of the plaintiff; it is, in effect,
a negligence standard. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir. 1977).
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), requiring proof of scienter on the part of the defendant as a prerequisite to recovery,
the due diligence standard is presently undergoing re-evaluation and consequent reformulation by the courts. See note 124 supra. In a recent decision, the Third Circuit has responded
to Ernst by reversing the burden of proof, thus making the question of due diligence an
affirmative defense. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976). On the other
hand, the Fifth Circuit has held that, in light of Ernst, a plaintiff should be barred from
recovery under rule lOb-5 only if he has been reckless in not attempting to discover the
alleged misrepresentations and omissions. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977).
138. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank of Jacksonville, 409
F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 411 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Harriman
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tronis companies,' 39 as well as financial statements 140 and estimated
projections of charter income, 14 1 constitute material facts.' 42 The
position of the plaintiffs dictates that they relied on EAB in its capacity both as entrepreneur and manager. 43 Perhaps the most
troublesome requirement that the plaintiffs must establish is that of
scienter. Though the requisite scienter may be shown circumstantially in EAB's failure to disclose known material facts, '44 it is questionable whether scienter 5can be established in regard
14
to misrepresentations of fact.
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975); Green v. Jonhop, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973).
139. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nureen & Co., Inc., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972); Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank of Jacksonville, 409
F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969); see City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
140. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 938 (1971); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972); Escott v. Bar Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (financial statements containing inaccurate
figures are misleading).
141. Estimates as to the present or the future status of an event and representations that
an incident will occur are misleading statements of fact within the ambit of rule IOb-5 if they
do not have a reasonable basis or are not believed by the speaker when made. Marx v.
Computer Science Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974); REA Express Inc. v. Interway Corp.,
410 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
142. This conclusion assumes, however, that the plaintiffs can substantiate that the alleged material information was known to EAB at the time disclosure was to be made. See
notes 123 and 124 supra.
143. Only EAB, a lead bank lender, had direct contact with the borrower and was responsible for structuring the loan and adequately securing collateral. See notes 7 and 8
supra, and text accompanying notes 32-40 supra.
However, where the materiality of the plaintiffs' alleged omissions can be established,
reliance will be presumed. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). But
see note 122 supra. However, Affiliated Ute should not be taken as a complete abolition of
the reliance requirement. In "misrepresentation," as opposed to "omission" cases, positive
proof of reliance on the misrepresented facts must still be shown by the plaintiff. Reeder v.
Mastercraft Electronics Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See note 121 supra.
But see Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that
reliance may be inferred from the materiality of the misrepresentation); Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1316 (2d Cir. 1974) (reliance is inferred where materiality is established).
144. See, e.g., Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 406 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Spielman v. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
145. The accuracy of EAB's disclosure of material information is to be measured by the
situation and the knowledge of the parties at the time they committed themselves, and not on
the basis of subsequent events. Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical Co. v. Bollo, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,130 (1977). Thus, the plaintiffs must show not only
that EAB had knowledge of the alleged material misrepresentations and omissions at the
time of the sale, but also that such misrepresentations and omissions were made with scien-
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The second and third elements of lOb-5 liability are not in issue in the case. The plaintiffs purchased the securities, in the form
46
of loan participations, in connection with the proscribed conduct. 1
Furthermore, a direct causal connection exists between EAB's conthe plaintiffs' participation and the resulting damduct in soliciting
47
ages suffered.'
Assuming the plaintiffs prove the existence of the three required elements, EAB's disclaimers of contractual liability, made in
the loan participation agreements, 148 will be ineffectual as a defense
to a 1Ob-5 action because of the anti-waiver provision included in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.149
Assuming, on the other hand, that plaintiffs fail to establish
scienter or one of the other requirements, a rule 1Ob-5 action will
not be viable. The mere potential of such an occurrence demands
that an alternate avenue to recovery be considered. The most appropriate option taken by the plaintiffs for this purpose is an action
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.15° The purpose of
ter. See note 136 supra; Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and lOb-5, 32 Bus. LAW. 147
(1976).
146. The phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" by a deceptive
device within the meaning of rule lOb-5 and section 10(b) making such purchase or sale
unlawful, means that the device employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort that would
cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and in connection therewith, so relying, cause
them to purchase the securities. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161, 180 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Kogan v. Nat'l Bank of North America, 402 F.
Supp. 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
147. In order to recover in a civil action under rule lOb-5, the plaintiffs must show a
causal connection between the alleged misrepresentations or omissions and their injury;
hence, the plaintiff must establish that the loss claimed to have been suffered was a consequence of the defendant's fraud. See, e.g., Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Polin v. Conductron Corp., 411 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mo. 1976). Since the
plaintiffs decided to purchase the participations, and join the loan syndicate managed by
EAB, on the basis of information supplied by EAB, causation is established where EAB can
be shown to have made a fraudulent disclosure of the information supplied. For the measure
of damages under rule lOb-5, see note 160 infra.
148. See note 22 supra.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1976): "Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void." See 6 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1810-17 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).
150. See note 24 supra. Section 12(2) is said to provide "one of the most powerful but
least appreciated weapons in the arsenal of a plaintiff in a securities fraud action."
Kaminsky, An Analysis ofSecurities Litigation Under Section 12(2) andHow it Compares with
Rule 10b-5, 13 Hous. L. REv. 231, 231 (1976). Unlike rule lOb-5, where a private right of
action has been judicially implied, section 12(2) creates an express civil remedy. However,
the class of plaintiffs that may recover under the statute is narrowly delineated, by its terms,
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section 12(2) is to protect investors from misstatements or omissions
of material fact which the seller either knowingly or carelessly communicates.' 5
Since the provisions of section 12(2) provide relief only to purchasers, the antifraud protections afforded therein relate primarily
to statements made in the prospectus or oral communication by the
seller made in connection with the sale of securities.' 5 2 Although
section 12(2) is identical to rule lOb-5 in many of its requirements,
notable distinctions exist which afford the plaintiffs an easier burden of proof.'53 Primarily, scienter is not required by section

12(2).

1

54

Furthermore, even though materiality must be established in
regard to misrepresentations and omissions, proof of reliance is not
required by section 12(2). 155The same standard used to determine
to purchasers of securities only; sellers are not covered. See, e.g., Greater Iowa Corp. v.
McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 789 (8th Cir. 1967); E.L. Aaron & Co., Inc. v. Free, 55 F.R.D. 401,
402 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Lynn v. Caraway, 252 F. Supp. 858, 865 (W.D. La. 1966), a f'd, 379
F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968). Under section 12(2) the plaintiff
purchaser's remedy is limited to recission; that is, a refund to the purchaser of the consideration he paid for the security in exchange for the return of the security to the seller. Pfeffer v.
Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F.
Supp. 1165, 1226 (D. Md. 1968), a]'din part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1124
(4th Cir. 1970).
Perhaps the most notable distinction possessed by section 12(2) in comparison to rule
lOb-5 is that this provision does not require positive proof of scienter as a prerequiste to
recovery; negligence will suffice. See Kaminsky, supra at 233-39, 253-80. See also text accompanying note 36 supra.
151. Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 302 F. Supp. 1371, 1375 (W.D.N.Y. 1969).
Although the statutory basis provided for liability is a negligence standard, section 12(2) is
recognized as an "antifraud section within the meaning this term now has under the securities laws." Kaminsky, supra note 150, at 233. Both registered securities and those exempt
from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act are within the purview of section 12(2).
See, e.g., Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Hill York Corp. v. American
Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). As such, section 12(2) places the burden
on the seller of any security to investigate carefully and disclose all material facts to the
purchaser before selling to him; failure to properly do so will require that the seller make a
refund, regardless of whether or not he intended to defraud the buyer. Kaminsky, supra note
150, at 239. See Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.
1971); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton,
297 F. Supp. 1165, 1219 (D. Md. 1968), af'd inpart,rev'd inparton other grounds, 422 F.2d
1124 (4th Cis. 1970).
152. See note 24 supra.
153. See note 150 supra; see generally Kaminsky, supra note 150.
154. See, e.g., Lewis v. Walston & Co., Inc., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Odette v. Shearson
Hammill & Co., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ferland v. Orange Groves of Florida, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
155. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir.
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materiality in rule lOb-5 actions is used as well. 15 6 In order to prevent liability under section 12(2), a defendant must show that he
did not know of the falsity contained in the prospectus or oral communication, and that the exercise of reasonable care would not
57
have revealed that a misrepresentation or omission was made.1
With the problem of scienter removed, and the procedural requirements satisfied, liability under section 12(2) can be established
on the basis of the same argument made for the action in rule lOb5. 58 Liability under section 12(2) allows the plaintiffs the remedy
of rescission and holds the seller liable for damages equal to the
consideration paid plus interest due.' 59 Effectively, the measure of
damages under section 12(2) or rule lOb-5 are the same.1 60 The use
1971); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356 (10th Cir. 1970); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton,
297 F. Supp. 1165, 1222 (D. Md. 1968), arf'dinpart,rev'd in part on othergrounds, 422 F.2d
1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
The theory is that [section] 12(2) is designed to put the burden of responsibility
upon those who would induce public reliance in the securities markets, namelv the
sellers of securities. To accomplish this policy, it is reasoned that the purchaser
should be relieved of all proof of reliance, and consistent with this policy, the purchaser need not prove causation either.
Kaminsky, supra note 150, at 264-65. Despite the partial abolition of the reliance requirement in lOb-5 cases, see note 132 supra, section 12(2) still places a significantly lesser burden
on a plaintiff than rule 1Ob-5, which requires a showing of causation-in-fact as a predicate to
recovery. Id. at 266.
156. See note 132 supra. The standard of materiality under section 12(2) and rule lOb-5
is considered the same. Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970); De Marco v.
Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1968); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165,
1218 (D. Md. 1968), aff'dinpart, rev'd inpart on othergrounds, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970);
Hewitt, supra note 128, at 899. See Kaminsky, supra note 150, at 258-62.
157. Section 12(2) expressly requires that the seller prove not only that he had no knowledge of the untruths or omissions, but also that he could not have learned the truth by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. See note 24 supra; Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir.
1970); DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968). Courts will impute constructive
knowledge to the defendant seller; thus, the defendant is deemed to know anything he could
readily have learned. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 696
(5th Cir. 1971); DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1968); Gould v. Tricon,
Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See Kaminsky, supra note 150, at 275-78.
See also Peterson, Recent Developments in Civil Liabilities Under Section 12(2) of the SecuritiesAct of1933, 5 Hous. L. REV. 274, 283, 291 (1967). The defenses of waiver and estoppel
are also available to a defendant seller in a 12(2) action. Kaminsky, supra note 150, at 27880.
158. The scope of misrepresentations and omissions is the same for section 12(2) as it is
for rule lOb-5. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970). See
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964).
159. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970); Pfeffer v. Cressaty,
223 F. Supp. 756 (D.C.N.Y. 1963). See note 150 supra.
160. Under rule 10b-5, the measure of damages is usually stated to be the difference
between the amount paid for the security and the true value of the security at the time of the
purchase. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975); Estate Counseling Serv-
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of remedies supplied by section
12(2) and rule 1Ob-5 are cumulative
61
and not mutually exclusive.'
In summation, the plaintiffs arguably may be able to establish
violations of rule 1Ob-5. In the event that scienter proves an insurmountable obstacle in establishing EAB's liability under rule lOb-5,
a strong alternative action exists under section 12(2).
IV.

THE IMPACT OF LEAD BANK LIABILITY UPON THE

INTERNATIONAL LENDING MARKET

Before concluding that lead bank liability under rule lOb-5 or
section 12(2) should be imposed whenever domestic branches of
United States banks are involved in participation lending, consideration must be given to the impact such a policy would have on the
dynamics of the international banking market.
In order to fully appreciate the impact that such a policy
would have, it is essential to discuss the present status of international banking. Once the dynamics of this system are established,
the effect of lead bank liability can be determined. Predictions concerning the ultimate effect of this policy can subsequently be made
on the basis of changing trends in international lending.
A.

An Overview of InternationalLending

The spectacular growth of the international lending market
within the past decade has followed from the expansion of its counterpart, international trade. 162 Increased efforts by United States
firms in manufacturing, resource extraction, and commerce to exploit their advantages in foreign markets precipitated the expansion
ice, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962);
Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,107 (1975). But cf. Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975
(1973); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971); Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). Exceptions to this rule sometimes exist where the security was bought for
investment and would not have been bought at all but for the fraud. See, e.g., Chasins v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Samet, Damages Under Rule 10b-5: The Out of
Pocket Measure Is Out of Order, 9 BEV. HILLS B.J. 35, 43 (1975). Although rule lOb-5 contains no express provision regarding interest, the courts have allowed an award of prejudgment interest as a matter of judicial discretion. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affldinpart,rev'dinparton othergrounds, 516
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975).
161. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'din
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
162. See note I supra, and accompanying text.
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of United States banks abroad in the mid-1960's. 163
Initially, integration into foreign markets was a means for
t 64
United States banks to serve multinational corporations abroad.
Subsequently, expansion overseas signified a means for United
States banks to circumvent domestic exchange controls-the
Interest Equalization Tax of 1963 and the Balance of Payment
Programs of 1965 and 1968.165 Domestic banks discovered that inlending-was a
ternational banking-particularly international
66
shares.'
market
increase
rapidly
to
means
163. See Aliber, supra note 1, at 9-10; Like Topsy, they just grow'd, THE ECONOMIST,
Jan. 22, 1977, at 9 [hereinafter cited as Like Topsy].
164. Lees, supra note 5, at 40-41; Thomas & Segall, Moneyweight Contenders, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at 5-6. The United States banks which have taken the lead in
international banking activities have relied heavily on overseas affiliates of United States
industrial corporations to build foreign loan servicing operations. Lees, supra note 5, at 41.
Major American banks needed to go abroad to service the overseas operation of their corporate customers or risk losing the business to foreign banks. Like Topsy, supra note 163, at 9.
Also, bank expansion abroad was furthered by the regulatory straight jackets put on banks
by both federal and state banking authorities which prevents interstate branch banking.
Once a bank reaches a certain size, further penetration into an existing market becomes
exceedingly difficult. Id.
165. Aliber, supra note 1, at 10; Lees, supra note 5, at 41; see Carson, Government Policies and the Eurodollar Market, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 58 (no. 4, 1975). The need for
American banks to expand overseas became essential after the introduction of strict balanceof-payment controls in the United States during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,
restricting the ability of American banks to use local funds to finance overseas customers and
for non-American companies to raise money in American capital markets. In order to meet
the financial needs of American customers with overseas subsidiaries, American banks began
setting up branches abroad capable of gathering and relending expatriate dollar funds, or
Eurodollars. Once some banks had established overseas operations their competitors were
obliged to follow, for unless they did so they risked losing even domestic business to those
banks better able to provide an international service. Like Topsy, supra note 163, at 9-10.
See Thomas & Segall, supra note 164, at 5-9.
166. The international earnings of the 13 American banks with the largest overseas operations for the period 1970-1975 reflects the remarkable success enjoyed as a result of expansion abroad.
The international earnings of these banks went up from 177 million dollars to 836
million dollars in 1975, a compound growth of 36.4 per cent a year. Over the same
years domestic earnings trod water-918 million dollars in 1975, against 884 million dollars in 1970, or a mere compound rate of growth of 0.7 per cent. . . . Put
another way it sounds even more startling: the rise in international earnings accounted for ninety-five per cent of the total growth in earnings.
Thomas & Segall, supra note 164, at 9.
International business also allowed American commercial banks the freedom for uninhibited expansion into merchant banking, a freedom withheld from them in the United
States by the Glass-Steagall Act. In 1969-1974, the 30 largest American banks spent 839
million dollars on acquiring merchant banks overseas. Like Topsy, supra note 163, at 10.
During the international trade boom of 1970-1975, American banks took advantage of their
close links with American multinational corporations; they also expanded their Eurodollar
business with non-American multinationals, and became more active in local currency mar-
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Foreign banks recognized the same promise for growth and
freedom from restrictions in the early 1970's. 167 In part, the greatly
increased activities of European and Japanese banks in the American financial market followed the surge of foreign investment in the
United States after the two devaluations of the dollar. 68 The
unique opportunities in the world financial system allowed for by

the United States market and its currency, provided an impetus for
rapid acceleration in the strength and number of foreign banks in
the United States. 169 Foreign banks now compete actively with domestic banks for local and international business. 17 0
Perhaps one of the greatest advantages international lending
offers banks, as compared with domestic lending, is the variety of

opportunities for diversification and spreading of risk."" l This pokets. This was the period when the American banks became truly multinationals. Id See
also note 164 supra, and note 192 infra.
167. Aliber, supra note 1, at 10; Edwards, supra note 1, at 7-8. Several advantages are
available to foreign banks operating in the United States which are not available to domestic
banks. Presently, foreign banks are subject only to the laws of the state in which they are
licensed; they do not have to adhere to the Federal Reserve requirements or other regulations; they are not subject to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 18411850 (1976), or the Glass-Steagall Act. Perkins, The Regulation of Foreign Banks in the
United States, 10 COLuM. J. WORLD Bus. 115, 116-17 (no. 4, 1975).
168. Aliber, supra note 1, at 10. Although the motives for entry into the United States
market are complex and varied, several impelling reasons can be identified: 1) Initially, foreign banks expanded abroad to provide financial services to United States subsidiaries of
foreign corporations, a goal similar to that pursued by American banks expanding overseas.
See note 154 supra, and accompanying text; 2) Since the dollar remains the world's major
transactions and reserve currency, foreign "parent" banks found United States offices convenient service centers for their customers' dollar operations; 3) Foreign banks could establish
investment banks to engage in underwriting and selling domestic securities, a practice from
which United States banks are barred by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (1933),
and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976), as amended
(BHCA); 4) Foreign branches were a means to provide services to American corporations
that had existing business relationships with the head office of the foreign bank; 5) The dismantling of capital restraint programs in the United States in January 1974, contributed to
the attractiveness of New York and other United States financial markets as an unfettered
source of funds for international financing, thereby increasing the flow of funds through
American financial markets. Klopstock, Foreign Banks in the United States.- Scope and
Growth ofOperations,MONTHLY REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,

June 1973, at 140; Terrell & Leimone, The U.S Activities of Foreign-OwnedBanking Organizations, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 87 (no. 4, 1975); See Perkins, supra note 167, at 116-17;
See also Lichtenstein, ForeignParticipationin UnitedStates Banking.-Regulatory Myths and
Realities, 15 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 879 (1974).
169. Perkins, supra note 167, at 117.
170. Id. During 1974, foreign banks made 9.0% of all commercial and industrial loans
made in the United States. Id.
171. This is due to the possibilities of achieving regional diversification, minimizing
country risk and undertaking a wider variety of types of credits. Lees, supra note 5, at 43-47.
See generally Ganoe, Controlling the Foreign Banks in the U.S, EUROMONEY, June 1975, at
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tential was realized with the advent of a new type of banking subsidiary in the international banking market. 17 2 As part of a strategy

employed by large international banks, designed to achieve broad
diversification and access to capital, special loan and credit making
providing new structural credit forms
affiliates were established,
17 3
and syndication loans.

Of the various kinds of international affiliates developed during the early 1970's, the medium-term consortium 174 bank stands
out in importance. Many of these banks were established in the
1970's by groups of internationally oriented banks for the purpose

of providing and syndicating medium-term loans in the Eurocurrency market. 7 5 These banks have enjoyed strong connections
through their parent institutions and have experienced rapid
growth in their Eurocurrency operations. 76 EAB is one such me-

dium-term consortium. 177
The introduction of medium-term syndication loans and the
subsequent establishment of medium-term consortium banks were
signs of the changing trends in international lending during the
early 1970's.' 7 8 Prior to this time, commercial banks active in the
75-76; Ruckdeschel, Risk in Foreign and Domestic Lending Activities of US. Banks, 10
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 50 (no. 4, 1975); Terrel & Leimone, The U.S. Activities of ForeignOwned Banking Organizations,10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 87 (no. 4, 1975); Thoman, InternationalBanking Can Be Profitablefor US. Regional Banks, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 23
(no. 4, 1975).
172. Lees, supra note 5, at 46; Thomas & Segall, supra note 164, at 5. See Curran, supra
note 7, at 55-65; Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 110.
173. Lees, supra note 5, at 46; Like Topsy, supra note 163, at 10-13; Banks UnderAttack,
supra note 28, at 110; Curran, supra note 7, at 55-61.
174. A medium-term consortium bank is an affiliate formed by a group of internationally orientated banks for the purpose of providing medium-term loans. See Lees, supra note
5, at 46.
175. Lees, supra note 5, at 46; Curran, supra note 7, at 63-65. Typically, a large percentage of these loans have been made to foreign governments or other official bodies. Like
Topsy, supra note 163, at 9. It is estimated that the amount banks lent in syndicated Eurocurrency credits increased from 6.9 billion dollars in 1972 to 29.3 billion dollars in 1974. Id. at
13. Lending to poor countries became avant garde for international bankers, and in 1972
banks lent these countries 2.5 billion dollars in syndicated credits. In 1973 and 1974, another
14 billion dollars was lent. So fierce was the competition for this business that at one stage
margins sunk to a ludicrous five-eights of 1.0%. Id. See Curran, supra note 7, at 57.
176. Lees, supra note 5, at 46; Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 110; See The 75
Most Active Lead Managersin the Euromarkets, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1976, at 24-25. The medium-term consortium bank can function either as a lead syndicating the loan itself or as a
participant pruchasing a participation in a syndicate arranged and organized by one of its
parent institutions. Lees, supra note 5, at 46. In late 1973, the consortium banks accounted
for 8.0% of the Eurocurrency claims held by London based institutions. Id.
177. Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 110. See note 31 supra.
178. The medium-term syndication loan was initially an outgrowth of the term loan
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547

international market made only short-term loans. 7 9 Medium-term
syndication loans met with favorable acceptance and widespread

use. In 1976, a year of relative stagnation for the Euromarkets as a

80
whole, syndicated Euroloans continued to expand rapidly.
Perhaps the most revealing indicator of the success enjoyed by
the medium-term syndication loan in international finance is seen
in its rapid acceptance and growing use in the Euromarkets. 18 1 The
widespread acceptance and use of loan syndications may well result
from the unique flexibility in structuring provided for under a syndicate arrangement. The medium-term syndicated Eurocurrency
credit market differs from the foreign and Eurobond markets in
that it is designed to accomodate two very different types of borrowers.' 8 2 This fact becomes particularly well pronounced now, at a

developed by commercial international banks to finance corporate investment projects. The
basic concept underlying the new international term loan was that the amortization of the
loan was adjusted to meet the project's cash flow; this required greater expertise for credit
analysis and for complex cash flow projections. Banks eventually were able to undertake
loans to foreign governments and to finance other project-related investments abroad. Subsequently, commercial banks took the lead and began to arrange syndicated term loans for
multinational corporations and government agencies. Curran, supra note 7, at 57. These
international lenders remain reluctant to finance long-term debts or imbalances in the current account of foreign governments. Neither of these uses is related to the cash flow of a
specific project; therefore, loans made are not by definition term loans. Id See Like Topsy,
supra note 163, at 10-13.
179. Until a few years ago, commercial banks usually lent to their best customers for a
maximum term of one year; companies needing longer-term funds went to the bond and
equity markets. Curran, supra note 7, at 58.
180. A faltering world recovery from a deep recession left the largest single element in
the Euromarkets-the short-term self-liquidating commercial Eurocurrency credits extended
directly by international banks-moving sluggishly. The growth of syndicated Euroloans
over the past year reflects the fact that determinants of their growth are essentially different
from those underlying the Euromarket as a whole. The slower-than-anticipated world recovery was offset, so far as the Euromarkets are concerned, by a substantially increased level of
syndicate credit lending. Euromarkets: Relative Stagnation in 1976, THE BANKER, Jan. 1977,
at 27. See note 175 supra. "The volume of new medium term Eurocurrency syndicated bank
credits has been running at an annual 25 billion dollars since mid-1975." Mendelsohn, supra
note 3, at 903.
181. Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 903; See Euromarkets." Relative Stagnation in 1976,
THE BANKER, Jan. 1977, at 27. "This market makes finance available to borrowers with
names which are not sufficiently saleable in the more select Eurobond market, while also
providing finance in far larger amounts than is possible through the issue of Eurobonds,
irrespective of the borrower's credit rating." Banks as Borrowers, THE BANKER, Jan. 1977, at
61. See note 182 infra, and accompanying text.
182. At one extreme, the top names in international lending are raising balance of payments financing in sums too big for the international bond markets, like the European Economic Community's borrowing for Italy in March, 1976. At the other extreme are borrowers
not quite strong enough for the international bond markets, notably the members of
Comecon and the relative handful of oil-importing developing countries with access to private capital markets. Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 905.
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time in the world's economy when the requests from such borrowers are numerous and running high.' 8 3 A borrower who seeks a me-

dium-term syndicate loan will pay handsomely for the lending
to leads and participants this means easy
arrangements he seeks;
184
money to be made.
As a matter of course, the organizational and managerial for-

mat taken on by the syndicate will depend in large part on the
amount sought by the borrower.1 85 With the increasing use of medium-term syndication loans in international lending, and the integration of foreign medium-term consortium banks in American
alike have befinancial markets, large and small domestic banks
86

come increasingly active in syndicate lending.

Yet, underlying the statistics is the cold reality that much of
the financing made during an intensely competitive world borrowers market of 1972 and 1973 involved too many risks. 8 7 Liberal
lending activities which financed the world tanker surplus, as well
as large scale real estate investments in Britain and the United
States, have left banking institutions throughout the world feeling
183. The combination of a sluggish world economy and a higher oil price is likely
to increase [lesser developing countries'] demand for Eurocredits quite substantially. The danger is that this will lead to a 'crowding out' situation, with the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries and other
industrialized borrowers (such as South Africa) denying access to some of the
poorer nations.
As it is, the syndicated credits market already tends to concentrate its lending
on the more prosperous of the [lesser developing countries], virtually to the exclusion of the middle and low income countries . . . . So long as domestic loan de-

mand remains depressed in the United States and other major industrial
economies, the international banks may well be able to meet the requirements of
both the OECD and lesser developing country oil importers. But mere ability to do
so does not imply willingness as well.
Reasonsfor Discrimination, Not Alarm, THE BANKER, Jan. 1977, at 51. See Mendelsohn,
supra note 3, at 905-07; Euromarkets: Relative Stagnation in 1976, THE BANKER, Jan. 1977,
at 27.
184. Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 903-07. See Sandeman, The Legal Tangle, THE
BANKER, Jan. 1978, at 75, 77; Reasonsfor Discrimination, Not Alarm, THE BANKER, Jan.
1977, at 51-52. See generally Curran, supra note 7, at 55-65. But see Harder Times, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at 21.
185. Curran, supra note 7, at 61, 63.
186. In 1976, eight of the ten leading managers of medium-term syndication credits were
American. Fogarty, The City's Staying Power, THE BANKER, Feb. 1978, at 67. See The 75
Most Active Lead Managers in the Euromarkets, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1976, at 24. As to the
activity of smaller American banks in syndicate lending, see note 15 supra. Despite the international activities of the smaller banks in the United States, the major American banks prevail as dominant in the field of global financing, as well as lead syndicate lenders. See note
166 supra and note 218 infra; Curran, supra note 7, at 63.
187. Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 109-10; Obstacle Course, THE ECONOMIST,
Jan. 22, 1977, at 22-25.
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expensive repercussions.188 Large banks have sufficient collateral
and capital to survive impending defaults without serious repercussions. 18 9 Smaller banks, however, are the most seriously threatened
by the current difficulties. 190
Unfortunately bankers have only themselves to blame for at least
part of what. . .[has] recently been described as a 'massive erosion of confidence.' The strong accentuation of the world busi-

ness cycle in the past four years helps to explain but has by no
means been the sole cause of foreign exchange losses in Europe,
property losses in Britain and America, the over-extension of
banks in the world tanker market and the increase in bad and
doubtful assets nearly everywhere. What has become clear in the
past 2 years is that although most bankers kept their heads, many
took more risks than they should have ....91
In light of it all, there are those who clearly insist that at least part
of the problem stems from the general absence of rules and regulations in international lending. 192 They contend that complexity and
magnitude are factors in the current market which preclude the
188. Aliber, supra note 1, at 9; Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 110; Faith, supra
note 30, at 14-16. See generally Harder Times, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at 21.
As to the risks taken by syndicates in Euromarket credits, it has been observed that
during the rapid growth of international lending in 1973-1974 "[mlany Euromarket credits
were arranged very quickly--often considerably faster than domestic syndicated credits
could be put together. As Mr. Johannes Witteveen, managing director of IMF, said in 1976,
'credits were sometimes granted in a market climate that wasn't very conducive to the maintenance of adequate (credit appraisal) standards.' " A Cash-FlowApproach to Sovereign Risk
Analysis, THE BANKER, Jan. 1977, at 55.

189. Barron's, June 2, 1975, at 33.
190. Id. See The Smaller They Are The Harder They Fall, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22,
1977, at 13-17. Perhaps the real reason that the repurcussions have been felt primarily by
smaller banks is to be found in an observation made by commentators in the field:
The real test of a bank's success or failure is not the loans that go bad. Rather, it is
the ability of the banks to generate enough earnings to finance growth even after
the subtraction of loan loss provisions, so long,of course, as these earnings are not
made doubtful by a lending portfolio that includes an excess of high risk loans.
Thomas & Segall, supra note 164, at 6. The strength of the major American banks in international lending well indicates their ability to generate earnings above and beyond any loss
experienced by bad loans. See note 166 supra.
191. Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 110.
192. Sandeman, The Legal Tangle, THE BANKER, Jan. 1978, at 75. As international
lending emerged as a global economic community of itself, perhaps the greatest obstacle to
any concomitant designation of clear-cut rules of order was the multinational character of its
members:
Bank regulatory systems in most countries, including the United States, have
evolved primarily in response to domestic banking development, and are oriented
largely to the regulation of the domestic activities of domestic banks.
The response of bank regulators to the rapid emergence of multinational
banking activities has been almost hesitant, sporadic and almost exclusively national. . . . [Tihe goals and means of bank regulation in this country and other
countries have not been designed with multinational banking in mind.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol8/iss3/10

40

Mosich: The Qualification of Loan Participations As Securities--The Poten
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 8

present informal procedures from continuing usage; clear-cut procedures and regulations, they say, are at long last an essential
need.193 Others protest the call for regulation and reform, asserting
that Euromarket bankers are the best and most efficient policemen
in the world's only truly international capital market. 94 The controversy continues.
In the medium-term syndication market competition has been
particularly fierce.195 And it suffices well to say that there are banks
playing in this ball park who will make what could be considered
questionable concessions to a prospective borrower in order to win
the business.196 The Colocotronis case, however, has become an illustrative caveat to syndicate lenders, and the emphasis appears
now to be shifting to a strong preoccupation with safer banking. 197
In light of this trend of precaution, the impact of making lead
banks legally vulnerable would predictably be seen in two phases:
an initial reaction and a subsequent adjustment.
Thomas & Segall, supra note 164, at 6 (quoting remarks made by the Senate Banking Committee).
193. Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75, 77. See Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at
109-10. As for the need for uniform disclosure procedures in syndicate lending as expressed
by some international lenders, see In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35.
194. Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75. See In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35.
195. Like Topsy, supra note 163, at 13; Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75. The experience
and access to capital resources of the major American lead banks appear to provide a selective advantage to these banks in the competition for borrowers. "Needless to say, a reputation for having successfully arranged a number of difficult credits in the past is advantageous
• to lead lenders seeking new borrowers. "It is essential to have the confidence of the
company or government with whom one is dealing. No one can run the risk of having a
syndication fail because it was badly structured or priced; governments are especially sensitive to this." Curran, supra note 7, at 58.
Although most banks would prefer to manage their own syndication, the factors of
reputation and experience noted above also exert an influence over the activities of lesser
qualified banks wishing to participate in the international market. "[Miost banks would prefer to participate in a well-structured syndication managed by a bank experienced in the
negotiation and syndication of large credits, rather than attempt to manage a syndication of
their own with the many risks that this entails." Id. at 63.
196. Colombia, for example, has managed to insist on writing loan agreements under its
own law, a concession which many regard as inexcusable. Yugoslavia has won a battle to
keep out clauses triggering a repayment if lending to them becomes illegal. Sandeman, supra
note 192, at 75.
197. Banks UnderAttack, supra note 28, at 109-10; Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75-77.
See In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35.
A year or so ago participating banks in a syndicate looked to the lead managers for assurances on the credit-worthiness of the obligor and were satisfied to receive an offering memorandum setting out a country's political, economic and
financial statistics. This is not so prevalent today, as participating banks, quite
rightly, feel the necessity to justify such a participation through their own anaysis
of credit risk.
Curran, supra note 7, at 58.
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B.

The Impact of Lead Bank Liability

The initial reaction of international lenders is prophesied in
the assessments of European and American bankers monitoring the
European-American suits.' 9 8 The vulnerability of lead banks to
rule 1Ob-5 damages would force drastic and costly changes in their
method of marketing participation loans in the United States. 199
Offering circulars sent to proposed participants would become documents of legal significance in America, and consequently would
require the lead to give proper disclosure. z° As well, lead banks
would be effectively prevented from deferring to the desires of borrowers to keep sensitive information confidential and out of the

placement memorandum. 2° ' Contrary to prior lead bank proce-

dures, potential liability would make standard practice of a bor-

rower approving and, in fact, certifying that all information is true,
accurate, and complete. 2 2 The long-standing tradition in international financial centers of "reliance on 'name' in lending or investment operations" 20 3 would be tarnished, if not entirely deflated, by
the necessity of such protection being granted to participants. 2 °

However, it appears that a part of the initial reaction by international lead lenders will be to circumvent such liability. By excluding small United States banks from participatory roles, lead
lenders may choose to deal only in true multibank syndicates where
198. Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6; Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6; In and
Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35.
199. Mathews, supra note 4, at 1,col. 6; But see In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35.
200. If offering circulars could possibly expose a lead bank to liability, this would inevitably mean a bigger role for legal talent; banks would be compelled "to have a lawyer check
every word" on the offering circular before participants were solicited. Mathews, supra note
4, at 18, col. 2. Other bankers disagree and claim that court decisions are necessary to clarify
procedures in international financial markets. In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35.
201. At the present time this is said to be a common practice in the lead-borrower relationship. Mathews, supra note 4, at 18, col. 2. But see Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75 (on
the changing trends prompted by the EAB suits).
202. Some bankers suggest that the EAB suits have already prompted banks to follow
this procedure. "Without such a guarantee," says Bankers Trust's Mr. Shirano, "Many banks
won't make an offering circular available to other banks." Mathews, supra note 4, at 18, col.
2. See Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 110; Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75-77.
203. Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6. Bankers regard themselves as a "community" and prefer to settle their differences in private. Until now international business has
usually been done on an informal basis, with banks relying on an unwritten code of ethics. In
and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35. See Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75.
204. Fleming & Wyles, supra note 16, at 6. However, the contrasting opinion has been
expressed that the present magnitude of international lending precludes the continuance of
informal "clubby" procedures and that definite and clear-cut practices must be established
now. In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35.
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larger international lenders participate in the active role of co-managers.20 5
Perhaps the greatest fear expressed by bankers monitoring the
EAB suits is that lead "liability" will inevitably subject loan syndications to an expensive registration process with the SEC. 2° In the
words of C.P. Brauch, president of Chase Manhattan Bank's Chase
Asia Ltd., "[tihis would kill the international syndication industry.
It would certainly drive out the American banks.

'2 7

Registration is

expensive and makes public, activities that many banks prefer to
keep secret.
Under the 1933 Act, bank securities are exempt from registration. It is questionable whether such a result would occur from establishing "lead" bank liability.20 8 Certain factors exist, however, to
suggest that these reactions may well be, in part, initial changes in
lending patterns that will inevitably give way to a subsequent
acceptance of a full disclosure policy for lead lenders marketing
participations which qualify as securities. The current trend in international lending toward safer banking policies reveals a concerted internal effort among major lead lenders to establish full
disclosure policies when offering participations.20 9 Other international lenders call for more action; they contend that definite and
clear-cut practices must be established in order to maintain the current magnitude of international lending.2"'
205. Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6. Banks have already become cautious and seek
to protect themselves against legal liability. Participation agreements are said to run to
greater length than ever before; as well, some lead banks have already turned their backs on
smaller banks in choosing potential syndicate partners. In and Out of Court,supra note 16, at
35; see Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 110; Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75. See
note 202 supra, and accompanying text.
206. Mathews, supra note 4, at 1,col. 6. But see Hennessy, Rating and Other Factors in
Approaching the U.S. CapitalMarkets-l, EUROMONEY,Mar. 1976, at 28.
207. Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6.
208. If loan participations are found to be securities, they may be exempt under § 3(a)(2)
of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976) exempts from registration and prospectus requirements "[alny security issued or guaranteed by any national bank or banking institution
organized under the laws of any State ... the business of which is substantially confined to
banking .. " Even if the exemptive provisions apply so that registration with the SEC or
some state securities commission is not required, distribution and trading remains subject to
several antifraud and anti-half-truth provisions, in particular rule lOb-5 and section 12(2).
Simpson, Investors Civil Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 71

(1961).
209. Banks Under Attack, supra note 28, at 110; In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at
35. See Curran, supra note 7, at 58. See note 202 supra.
210. In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35. It has further been observed that smaller

banks participating in international lending do not have the resources to deal in such an
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At the present time, the international nature of the market
makes it hard to decide how adequate loan documentation and disclosure, in fact, are; loan documents are generally tailored to national law. 2"1 ' The imposition of federal disclosure requirements on
American involvement in the offer, as well as the sale and purchase
of loan participations, would provide a uniform standard of full

disclosure of all material facts wherever such a transaction could be
reached by United States jurisdiction.
The collective and individual strengths of the American banks
can not be questioned.2" 2 And some indication exists that the international lending activities of United States banks, in particular syndicate lending, may substantially increase in the future.2 13
Although the smaller American banks are not unimportant,
the "big twelve," the so-called twelve major banks in the United
informal way with international business; this is an additional reason for formulating rules.
Id See also note 36 supra.
211. Sandeman, supra note 192, at 77. See generally note 192 supra.
212. American banks are now ahead of their foreign competitors' international currency
lending. Approximately 140 United States banks have an international presence of some
kind. The smaller American banks have approximately 200 branches abroad, with aggregate
assets of 40 billion dollars. These smaller banks are not unimportant, but the "big twelve"
remain dominant; these twelve include: Bank of America, Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover, Morgan Guaranty, Chemical Bank, Bankers Trust Company, Continental Illinois, First National Bank of Chicago, Wells Fargo, Marine Midland of New York, and
First National Bank of Boston. In 1974, this group collectively represented 75% of total
American overseas branches. The Smaller They Are The Harder They Fall,THE ECONOMIST,
Jan. 22, 1977, at 13. See notes 164 and 166 supra.
213. As to the competition posed by American financial markets to London's continuing
status as the center of the medium-term eurocurrency syndications loans:
In December 1976 the dollar accounted for more than 70 per cent of the Eurocurrency market. London's share of the Eurodollar market has always been signficantly higher than has its share of the other Eurocurrencies; and any developments
affecting the dollar sector have a sharp impact in London. There are a number of
possible developments in the dollar arena that will bear watching:.
(1) It is being proposed, not for the first time, that New York City should establish
a 'Montetary Free Trade Zone'. Under this arrangement, banks would be allowed to establish branches which would deal specifically in international
transactions; they could accept non-US deposits free of the burden of nonearning reserves and at rates unrestricted by Regulation Q and they could
make loans to foreign borrowers without city or state taxation on the related
earnings. In effect, this would enable the American banks to move to New
York a large amount of the identical business which they presently undertake
in offshore centres.
While this idea is in its infancy', the potential advantages to New York
City are manifest, and if-and it's a very big 'if-the necessary legislation
were to be passed, one could argue the prospect of a major shift in the centre
of the syndicated loan market for the following reasons:
According to Eurostudy, in 1976 eight of the 10 leading managers of
medium-term syndicated credits were American.
Many of the credit and sovereign risk decisions are already taken in the
United States. The New York legal and financial infra-structure is more
than adequate.
Fogarty, The City's Staying Power, THE BANKER, Feb. 1978, at 71.
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States, remain dominant over international activities.21 4 That the
top lead lenders in the Euromarket number among the big twelve
seems to indicate that a mandatory requirement of full disclosure
imposed upon them would, in turn, influence disclosure requirements throughout the market.
The question remains, however, whether some bankers would

not find the disclosure requirements of section 12(2) and rule lOb-5
a bit too sticky.2 15 Borrowers possessing confidential information of
a sensitive sort may prefer to acquire financing outside the reach of
United States securities regulation rather than make public all material facts. 2 16 Furthermore, what economic ramifications would

follow from making such sensitive information public?
In light of the possibilities, leading American syndicate managers may find the problems posed by section 12(2) and rule lOb-5
regulation too imposing; so much so that at least some of these
banks could be expected to utilize tactics designed to preclude any
21 7
control by the securities acts over the disclosure of information.
One such tactic would be for a lead bank not to sell participations
that could constitute securities. Effectively, this would mean that
the syndicate arrangement will not pass muster under the Howey
test to qualify as a security. 8 Without the offer, sale, and purchase
of a "security," the disclosure requirements of section 12(2) and
219
rule lOb-5 will not apply.
214. See notes 166 and 212 supra.
215. For observations made by commentators in the field as to potential problems in the
disclosure of information, see Sandeman, supra note 192; Hennessy, Ratings and Other Factors in Approaching the US. CapitalMarkets-Il, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1976, at 28 (particularly discussing problems of full disclosure under the United States securities regulations).
216. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 18, col. 2; Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75.
217. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6; In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35.
As was observed by one commentator in regard to the changes in procedure that have already been generated by the pending EAB suits:
[Blanks started to call what had been the placement memorandum an information
memorandum, and to supply only what information they had been given by the
borrower. Information memoranda now start out with an emphatic disclaimer by
the banks concerned, and the document is usually signed by the borrower, who asks
the lead manager in a special letter to distribute it to potential customers. This
ought to wash the banks hands of any responsibility if anything can, but quite a
few Euro-bankers take the view that the information memorandum will always remain a selling document: it would be hard to argue in court that the lead managers
were involved in an arcane form of journalism, or just thought the other banks
might like to know what was going on.
Sandeman, supra note 192, at 75, 77.
218. For a discussion of the qualification of a loan participation as a security under the
Federal Securities Acts, see text accompanying notes 53-119 supra.
219. See notes 25 and 26 supra, and accompanying text.
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A means that could be used to accomplish this result would be
for lead lenders to engage in true multibank loan syndications,
rather than syndications similar to those used by EAB 2 20 and now
involved in the pending suits. The distinction that exists in such an
arrangement is that each of the participants in a true multibank
syndicate also attains the status of co-manager. 2 2' In the EAB loan

participation syndications," only EAB, as the lead bank, acquired a
managerial position. 222 The difference between the two appears
sufficient to qualify the agreement between the co-lending banks of
a true multibank syndicate as a joint venture instead of a secur223
ity.

Without anticipating the European-American Banking suits,
this approach to loan syndications appears to be the recent trend in
London, the financial center for medium-term syndicates.22 4 In-

stead of the originating bank single-handedly managing the entire
loan, management groups are formed exclusively of banks in the
area. 225 In the event that lead lenders follow this trend to circumvent United States legal liability, two effects will occur.
First, United States financial markets will avoid syndications
which require extensive marketing of participations in order to
keep the international medium-term loans under the exclusive preserve of large international lenders in the United States.2 2 6 Smaller
banks that wish to actively continue participation in the international market would have no alternative but to expand overseas,
taking the risk involved upon their own shoulders.2 2 7
220. See note 7 supra.
221. See note 11 supra; Curran, supra note 7, at 61, 63.
222. See note 80 supra, and accompanying text. See also note 83 supra.
223. The distinction between a securities investment and a joint venture is that in the
former the investor's profit must come from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others, whereas in the latter each member of the co-venture shares in a mutual right of
control. See note 111 supra.
224. Curran, supra note 7, at 60. See Fogarty, The City's Staying Power, THE BANKER,
Feb. 1978, at 67.
225. This means that the loan agreement is made under the law of the management
group's situs and all changes and negotiations pertaining to documentation occur there also.
Curran, supra note 7, at 61.
226. "According to a Eurostudy in 1976, eight of the ten leading managers of mediumterm syndicated credits were American [banks]." Fogarty, The City's Staying Power, THE
BANKER, Feb. 1978, at 67. See generally note 212 supra. The major United States banks, by
virtue of their strength in the medium-term Eurocredit syndication market appear capable of
excluding smaller banks from participation. This appears particularly true in light of the fact
that smaller banks presently feel more competent as participants than lead lenders. See note
195 supra.
227. Another possibility is that smaller American banking institutions will form consor-
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Secondly, each party in the management group will get a slice
of the front-end commitment fee.22 8 If such syndications were to
limit the number of participants in the syndicate to the members of
the managerial group, United States securities regulation and potential liability would be entirely circumvented, 229 or so it appears.2 3 o

However, the use of true multibank loan syndicates over the
use of participation loans will deprive lead lenders of certain advantages acquired by virtue of their position. The lead bank in a
loan participation syndicate not only acquires a tremendous power
23 1
in being able to direct the allocation of such substantial sums,
but it also profits from both ends of the syndicate arrangement in
terms of managerial fees paid by participants 232 and commitment
fees paid initially by borrowers.2 33 If the active participation of
many banks in loan participation syndications translates into a
greater ability for lead lenders to provide more syndications to
more borrowers, the benefits attained by virtue of a lead bank position are truly enhanced.
tium banks as a means of entering the highly competitive Eurocurrency market. Lees, supra
note 5, at 46. But see notes 186 and 195 supra, and accompanying text.
228. See Curran, supra note 7, at 64. Front end fees and commission comprise the lucrative part of international business; competition is keen between international lenders for lead
and co-managerial positions. The Leopards Change Their Spots, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22,
1977, at 17, 18-21.
229. See notes 220-223 supra, and accompanying text. In London, the majority of syndicates arranged limit the number of participants to the number of managing banks. Curran,
supra note 7, at 61. Hence, this strongly suggests a trend in lending patterns which American
lead lenders may well choose to follow. However, if loan participations were also sold to
banks outside the management group, that group as a whole could well be held responsible
for full disclosure under the Securities Acts if American participation therein could be used
to establish jurisdiction.
230. Although a true multibank syndicate appears to take on the characteristics of a
joint venture, see note Ill supra, the context over text method of defining a security requires
the examination of substance rather than form. Hence, the inquiry must go beyond the basic
contractual outlines of the transaction and into actual business practices. See United Housing Foundation Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975). The distinction between a joint
venture and a security is perhaps in some instances a fine line, see note 223 supra. It would
seem that where a participating bank took only a small interest in a true multibank syndicate, the right of joint control it attains as co-manager may be nominal only. This result may
be dictated not only by business realities, but also by geographical barriers. If the involvement of a co-managing bank in a true multibank syndicate were purely ministerial with little
impact upon the ultimate success of the venture, the argument could be made that the agreement should be considered a security. See generally text accompanying notes 53-119 supra.
231. See, e.g., The Leopards Change Their Spots, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at 18.
232. See Curran, supra note 7, at 61, 63.
233. See note 15 supra; Curran, supra note 7, at 61, 63.
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The threatened exclusion by lead lenders of smaller banks
from participation in lending syndicates has already begun to materialize in the American financial market.2 34 Yet, whether this
change in lending patterns will continue with any fervor for any
length of time remains to be determined in light of the loss felt by
lead lenders in sharing the managerial position as well as the con-

tinuing demands made for future financing.
The international banking system is said to be a lender's market. 23 5 Its growth in recent years has been propelled by increasing
demands for financing from all levels of the world's economy. 23 6 By
meeting these demands, international lenders are ultimately left to
determine which areas of the world economy will receive funds and
under what terms such funds will flow. 2 3 7 At the present time, the
level of competition among lenders for international borrowers is
fierce. 238 Although the need for funding clearly exists in numerous
sectors throughout the world, banks are predicted to give careful
consideration to the risk involved before providing such loans.23 9
234. In and Out of Court, supra note 16, at 35.
235. See note 3 supra.
236. The increasing number of requests for financing coming from Third World and
developing countries (LDC) illustrates one example where much of the capital resources
available have already been committed. Curran, supra note 7, at 63, 65. See Hauge, The
Challenges That International Banking Now Faces, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1976, at 43; Reasons
for Discrimination, Not Alarm, THE BANKER, Jan. 1977, at 51; Like Topsy, supra note 163, at
9; Third World Risks, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at 25. The pressures to provide the
financing that translates the promises for a better life political leaders make to their people
continue to increase.
This continuing and rising tide of expectations is found in every quandrant of
the globe, developed or developing, OPEC or non-OPEC. Given the drama of a
United Nations General Assembly or Nairobi UNCTAD meeting, they are mirrored concretely in the demand for nuclear energy projects, metropolitan subways,
drilling platforms, and for schools, hospitals and housing everywhere. They all
carry high price tags.
Hauge, supra, at 43.
237. See Reasonsfor Discrimination, Not Alarm, supra note 236; 4 Cash-Flow Approach
to Sovereign Risk Analysis, THE BANKER, Jan. 1977, at 55.
Banks that want to survive must be present in New York, London, Tokyo,
Frankfurt, and Zurich simultaneously. These and other centers spread all over the
world are the ones-and this will become even more apparent in the future-in
which the most momentous financial operations, perhaps even the outcome of
world economy and finance, will be decided.
Sindona, Multinational Banking, THE BANKERS MAGAZINE, Spring 1974, at 56.

238.

See note 195 supra, and accompanying text; Third World Risks, supra note 236, at

26.
239. Reason for Discrimination, Not Alarm, supra note 236, at 51-52; A Cash-Flow Approach to Sovereign Risk Anaysis, supra note 237, at 55-59; Third World Risks, supra note
236, at 25-26.
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Due to the unique nature of syndicate lending, many borrowers that would not be able to secure financing in other areas of the
market can be accomodated under a syndicate arrangement. 24 ° The
utilization of syndications provides for the spreading of risk among
participants.2 4 ' The obvious factor remains that the risk decreases
as the number of banks participating increases. The use of largely

marketed participation syndicates also allows smaller banks to diversify their risk by participating in a number of different syndications. The use of medium-term syndications of the nature utilized
by EAB are, in this sense, well suited to meet the present demands
being made for financing.24 2 Should lead banks choose to meet
these demands, smaller American banks and others appear to be a

willing group of participants.243
Under the requirements of section 12(2) and rule lOb-5, a lead
bank can only be held responsible for the disclosure of material
information, and not for the success or failure of the loan itself.2"
By allowing for these protections, participants will be guaranteed a
full and accurate disclosure of material information upon which an
informed decision can be made.24 5
This policy of full disclosure would favor sound lending practices by requiring lead lenders to thoroughly evaluate the proposed
loan syndication. 2' At a time in the international lending market
when too many loans already made are labeled "risky," the disclosure requirements of section 12(2) and rule lOb-5 would replace the
sense of caveat emptor that now exists in the marketplace with a
240. See notes 181 and 182 supra, and text accompanying note 182 supra.
241. See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
242. This stems from the fact that many of the borrowers seeking financing are of the
type that would not qualify for loans in other areas of the market. See notes 181 and 182
supra, and text accompanying note 182 supra; Reasonsfor Discrimination,Not Alarm, supra
note 236, at 51-55.
243. See Like Topsy, supra note 163, at 9-10, 13; The Smaller They Are The Harder They
Fall,THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at 21; The Leopards Change Their Spots, supra note
231, at 17-21.
244. A lead bank would be held, at the threat of potential liability under section 12(2)
and rule IOb-5, to provide participants with a full disclosure of material facts reasonably
known to it at the time of the offer and sale. See generally text accompanying notes 120-159
supra.
245. See note 128 supra.
246. The real impact on the responsibility of a lead bank for the disclosure of information in offering a loan participation will be the terms in which a court decision in favor of the
plaintiffs in the EAB suits were actually couched. However, if lead lenders can be held liable
under section 12(2) and rule lOb-5, it only follows from the potential for liability that more
care will be given to evaluating the loan than has been given in the past. See note 188 supra.
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practice of fair dealing and honesty.2 47 If the leading American
banks would be willing to accept the Federal Securities Acts' standard for disclosure, their collective strength in the international
market would exert influence on the quality of disclosure in syndicate lending as a whole. The nature of the market, and the possibilities that a borrower may have sensitive information in his
background which best remains confidential, suggests that the future use of loan participations which could qualify as securities will
be limited to those discriminatory circumstances where full disclosure can be given. With lead lenders being required to provide all
material information in such instances, a proposed participant is
guaranteed the opportunity of making an informed decision.248
This guarantee seems to imply that the quality of loan syndications
made, and the risks taken, would correspondingly improve.
V.

CONCLUSION

It appears likely that the loan participations purchased by the
plaintiffs in the pending European-American Banking suits do possess the necessary features as dictated by the Howey test to bring
them into the definition of securities.24 9 Once a loan participation is
determined to constitute a security, an affirmative duty to disclose
may be imposed by rule lOb-5 25 ° or section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933.251
Whether the plaintiffs will be able to establish liability under
rule lOb-5 will depend upon successfully establishing the requisite
elements of a lOb-5 action.2 52 The most difficult obstacle that the
plaintiffs will be required to overcome appears to be the element of
scienter. 253
In the event that liability under rule lOb-5 cannot be established, a viable alternative exists under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.254 The plaintiffs have an easier burden of proof
247. The fundamental purpose of rule 10b-5 and section 12(2) was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and to protect persons who engage in buying and selling securities. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970);
Shuman v. Serman, 356 F. Supp. 911 (D. Md. 1973); Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co.,
302 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1969).
248. See notes 123, 128, 131 & 132 supra.
249. See text accompanying notes 27-119 supra.
250. See notes 25, 123 & 124 supra.
251. See notes 24, 150 & 151 supra.
252. See text accompanying notes 120 & 149 supra.
253. See notes 135 & 136, 144 & 145 supra, and accompanying text.
254. See note 24 supra.
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under section 12(2), 25 which encompasses both negligent and in-

tentional material misrepresentations 25 6 and does not require that
the element of scienter be proven to establish liability.257 If the
plaintiffs are unable to establish their case under rule lOb-5, there is
a strong possibility that liability under section 12(2) can be established.2 5 8
The ultimate outcome of placing liability on the lead bank appears to be reasonable and well justified, particularly when it is
considered that the plaintiffs and others like them would have no
course for redress adequate to compensate for the damages suffered. It is believed that the impact of holding a lead bank liable
will seriously effect the international lending market.2 59 Undoubtedly, many lead lenders will move away from the use of participation loans,260 such as the ones present in the pending EuropeanAmerican suit, and will form true syndicate loans 26 ' which clearly
do not carry the characteristics of a security, but rather retain the
qualities of commercial lending.26 2 In light of the fact that EAB was
only one of many international lenders that helped "finance" the
world tanker glut,263 it appears that this additional vulnerability
will, as described by one New York banker, "put a real fenderbender on the international loan market. '' 264 Lead bank liability
will undoubtedly initially drive out some of the lead banks in the
United States, and attempts will be made to exclude smaller banks
from participation in international loans.2 65
However, it appears that this predicted reaction on the part of
the American financial market is an initial reaction which may well
give rise to a subsequent adjustment and acceptance of the full disclosure policy embodied in the United States securities regulations.
The trend in international lending is currently toward safer banking policies and fuller disclosure.26 6 Moreover, the need for clearcut rules and practices in the international banking market has
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See note 153 supra, and accompanying text.
See notes 150 and 151 supra, and accompanying text.
See note 154 supra, and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 150 & 161 supra.
See text accompanying notes 198-208 supra.
See text accompanying notes 5-15, 178 & 186 supra.
See note 7 and 11 supra, and text accompanying notes 217-225 supra.
See notes 111, 220-223 supra; but see note 230 supra.
See notes 30 and 32 supra.
Mathews, supra note 4, at 1, col. 6.
See text accompanying note 205 supra.
See text accompanying note 209 supra.
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been expressed from various sectors.2 67 International bankers have
become all too aware of substantial risks taken in large loans already made;2 61 and if the international banking arena is left to regulate itself, as others in international lending insist is the only
proper avenue to regulation,26 9 then what assurance is there that
voluntary disclosure policies, self-imposed by lenders, will provide
adequate protection?
Under the requirements of section 12(2) and rule lOb-5, a lead
bank can only be held liable for the full disclosure of all material
facts in the offer or sale and purchase of a loan participation which
qualifies as a security, and not for the ultimate success or failure of
the loan. Such a requirement would favor sound lending practices
as well as provide protection to participating banks. Although it is
said that the potential for lead bank liability under section 12(2)
and rule lOb-5 would drive the major American lead lenders out of
the syndication market, in light of their current position of strength,
can this be said to be likely? Most assuredly, if the major American
lead banks chose to continue in the business of loan participation,
thus accepting the regulation of full disclosure under the Securities
Acts, the impact would effect lending practices and disclosure policies throughout the world.
The use of participations is well suited to meet many of the
current needs that exist for financing. Yet, if the problems of full
disclosure are too great, such as for loan documentation containing
sensitive information, an alternative means for financing will need
to be found. However, where full disclosure can be made, the continued use of widely marked loan participations is likely.
Susan K. Mosich *

267. See text accompanying notes 192, 193 & 210 supra.
268. See text accompanying notes 187, 188 & 191 supra.
269. See text accompanying note 194 supra.
* As this article proceeded to the final stage of publication, a settlement was reached
between the parties to the European-American Banking suits. However, as the context in
which these cases arose is highly reflective of international loan participation arrangements,
the legal issues raised remain relevant and of interest and concern to lenders in the international marketplace.
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